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Campisi: Edgar v. MITE Corp. and CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America: A

EDGAR v. MITE CORP. AND CTS CORP. v.
DYNAMICS CORP. OF AMERICA: A
SUBJECTIVE LOOK AT STATE TAKEOVER
LEGISLATION
I.

INTRODUCTION

Edgar v. MITE Corp.' and CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of

America' are the only two cases to date in which the Supreme Court
of the United States has ruled on the constitutionality of state laws

which regulate tender offers. 3 In both instances the state statutes

were challenged on the grounds that they conflicted with the federal
1. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
2. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
3. A tender offer is
[a] public offer or solicitation by a company, an individual or a group of persons to
purchase during a fixed period of time all or a portion of a class or classes of securities of a publicly held corporation at a specified price or upon specified terms for
cash and/or securities.
E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 70 (1973) [hereinafter TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL]; see also Note, The Developing Meaning of
"Tender Offer" Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1250, 1270-81
(1973) (presenting four approaches to defining the term "tender offer").
The impetus for regulation of tender offers is said to have been the emergence of the
tender offer as a means of acquiring corporate control in the 1960's. See Hayes & Taussig,
Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1967, at 135, 135. This emergence has been attributed to a "continued drive for expansion and diversification by many
businesses . . . .", id. at 136, a decreasing number of willing merger partners, id., and the ease
and low costs with which tender offers are accomplished. Id. at 137. Other underlying reasons
for the extensive use of tender offers include:
1. Increased corporate liquidity and readily available credit;
2. Comparatively depressed price/earnings ratios, book values, and cash or quick
assets ratios, making acquisition via the tender offer more attractive;
3. Greater recognition ... and knowledge ... [of] the technique;
4. Lack of extensive federal and state regulation of tender offers;
5. Quicker and more successful results when compared with a ... proxy contest;
6. Greater flexibility . ..;
7. Psychology-the appeal to stockholders .. .; [and]
8. [R]educed costs ....
TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL, supra, at 65-66; see also E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN, & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 1-2
(1977) (listing similar reasons for the widespread use of tender offers).
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laws regulating tender offers under the Williams Act4 and that they
violated the Commerce Clause.5 It is the standards set forth in these
two cases that now act as the standards by which all state takeover

legislation6 is judged.7 The problem, this Note argues, is the subjectivity of the tests applied by the Court.
First, under the preemption analysis, the Court has determined
4. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
6. The vast majority of states have enacted takeover legislation. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.
§9 45.57.010-.120 (1986); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-1201 to -1223 (Supp. 1988); ARK.
STAT. ANN. §§ 23-43-101 to -117 (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-374a to -374c (West
1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 607.109- to -. 110
(West Supp. 1989); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-2-1131 to -1133 (1989); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 415171 to -172 (1985 & Supp. 1988); IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1601 to -1614, 30-1701 to -1710 (Supp.
1989); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 to -11 (West Supp. 1988); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 502.211
to -.218 (West Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1276 to -1284 (1981 & Supp. 1986); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 271A.396-.399 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 12:135 to :140.17 (West Supp. 1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 611-A (Supp.
1988); MD. Bus. REG. CODE ANN. §§ 3-202, 3-601 (1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 110C IIOE (West Supp. 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 450.1775-.1784 (West Supp. 1988);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 302A.671, 302A.673 (West Supp. 1989); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 79-25-1
to -9 (Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 351.407, 351.459 (Vernon Supp. 1989); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 21-2431 to -2453 (Supp. 1988); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 78.378-.379 (Michie
Supp. 1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 421-A:1 to :16 (1983 & Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN.
H9 14A:IOA-1 to -6 (West Supp. 1988); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 513, 912 (McKinney 1986);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-75 to -79.1, 55-90 to -96 (Supp. 1988); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
1701.83-.85 (Anderson 1985 & Supp. 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1145-1155 (West
Supp. 1989); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 71-85 (Purdon Supp. 1989); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 35-2101 to -110, 35-2-210 to -226 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 47-321 to -48 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-35-201 to -209, 48-35-301 to -312 (1988); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 61-6-1 to -12 (Supp. 1989); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-725 to -727 (1989);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 23A.50.010-.901 (Supp. 1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 180.726
(West Supp. 1988).
7. See, e.g., Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 848 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1988) (reviewing Ohio's statute); Hyde Park Partners v. Connolly, 839 F.2d 837 (1st Cir. 1988) (reviewing
Massachusetts' statute); L.P. Acquisition Co. v. Tyson, 772 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1985) (reviewing Michigan's statute); Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Serv. Co., 715 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir.
1983) (reviewing Oklahoma's statute); Telvest Inc. v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1983)
(reviewing Virginia's statute); Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir.
1982) (reviewing Michigan's statute); National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122
(8th Cir. 1982) (reviewing Missouri's statute); RP Acquisition Corp. v. Staley Continental,
Inc., 686 F. Supp. 476 (D. Del. 1988) (reviewing Delaware's statute); Veere Inc. v. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co., 685 F. Supp. 1027 (N.D. Ohio 1988) (reviewing Ohio's statute); Batus,
Inc. v. McKay, 684 F. Supp. 637 (D. Nev. 1988) (reviewing Nevada's statute); BNS Inc. v.
Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1988) (reviewing Delaware's statute); Terry v.
Yamashita, 643 F. Supp. 161 (D. Haw. 1986) (reviewing Hawaii's statute); Icahn v. Blunt,
612 F. Supp. 1400 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (reviewing Missouri's statute). See generally Edgar v.
MITE Corp.: Supreme Court's First Substantive Ruling on State Takeover Legislation, 29
CORP. L.J. 171, 172 (1982) (noting the significant precedential value of MITE).
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the applicable standard to be a "purpose" analysis, under which the
Court will invalidate a state statute which "stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress." The Court, however, has expanded this test beyond
the legislative purpose of the Williams Act, namely investor protection, by commingling the concepts of this legislative purpose with the
policies behind specific means with which Congress sought to protect
investors.' By so doing, this Note argues that the Court has created
an unclear, subjective standard that may be used to invalidate state
laws which arguably further the concept of investor protection and
which relies too heavily on a court's characterization of the challenged law.' 0
Secondly, under the Commerce Clause, the use of the balancing
test enunciated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc." in both MITE and
CTS has also created a subjective standard that can be used to invalidate state laws.' 2 In fact, this test arguably will allow a court to
invalidate a state law which has met all the objective criteria of
other Commerce Clause tests.'"
This Note will present detailed case studies of both Edgar v.
MITE Corp. 4 and CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America.15
These analyses will include a presentation of the challenged statutes,
the factual and procedural histories of both cases, and the decisions
reached by the Court. In addition, a brief study of the purpose and
provisions of the Williams Act is also presented.' 6 This Note then
presents a detailed analysis of the two cases in the areas of preemption 17 and the Commerce Clause,' 8 and identifies the problem of the
unnecessary use of subjective analysis by the Court in these two contexts. Finally, this Note concludes that this subjective analysis
8. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); see also CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.

of America, 481 U.S. 69, 79 (1987) (quoting the Hines language); Edgar v. MITE Corp. 457
U.S. 624, 631 (1982) (quoting the Hines language).

9. See infra notes 231-330 and accompanying text.
10.
11.
12.

See infra notes 231-330 and accompanying text.
397 U.S. 137 (1970).
See infra notes 361-393 and accompanying text.

13. See infra notes 368-91 and accompanying text.
14.
case).

481 U.S. 624 (1982); see infra notes 20-99 and accompanying text (discussing the

15. 481 U.S. 69 (1987); see infra notes 100-185 and accompanying text (discussing the
case).

16. See infra notes 185-221 and accompanying text.
17.

See infra 222-311 and accompanying text.

18. See infra notes 330-92 and accompanying text.
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should not be undertaken by the courts and offers a proposal as to
what standards should be employed.19

II.
A.

EDGAR V.

MITE

CORP.

The Illinois Business Takeover Act

The purported purpose of the Illinois Business Takeover Act2 °
was to "protect the interests of Illinois securityholders of companies
having a close connection with [Illinois] without unduly impeding
take-over offers, and [the] Act [was to] be interpreted so as to strike
a balance that [did] not favor either management of a target company or an offeror." 21
The provisions of the Illinois statute applied to any "take-over
offer" 22 made for corporations of which shareholders located in Illinois owned ten percent of the class of equity securities subject to the
tender offer,2 3 or for which any two of the following three conditions
were met: the corporation had its principal offices in Illinois, 24 was
organized under the laws of Illinois,2 5 or had at least ten percent of
26
its stated capital and paid-in-surplus represented within Illinois.
If the Act was determined to be applicable to the offer in question, it required the tender offeror to register the offer with the Illinois Secretary of State. In addition, the offeror had to notify the
target company of its intent to make a tender offer and the terms of
that offer twenty days before the tender offer became effective. 28
During this twenty day period, the offeror could not communicate its
offer to the shareholders, but the target company's management was
free to disseminate information to its shareholders concerning the
impending offer. 29 The offer would then become registered within
twenty days after the registration statement was filed with the Secretary of State unless the Secretary called a hearing.30
19.
20.
21.

See infra notes 331-400 and accompanying text.
ILL REV. STAT. ch. 121 , paras. 137.51-.70 (1979) (repealed 1983).
Id. phra. 137.51-1.

22. See id. para. 137.52-9 (defining "take-over offer" as "the offer to acquire or the
acquisition of any equity security of a target company, pursuant to a tender offer .... "); see
also Id. para. 137.52-10 (defining "target company").
23.

Id. para. 137.52-10(1).

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. para. 137.52-(10)(2)(a).
Id. para. 137.52-10(2)(b).
Id. para. 137.52-10(2)(c).
Id. para. 137.54A.
See id. paras. 137.54B, 137.54E.
See id. para. 137.54A.
Id. para. 137.54E.
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The Secretary of State could call a hearing at any time during
the twenty day period to determine the fairness of the offer. 1 In
addition, the hearing had to be held if requested by a majority of
outside directors of the target company 32 or by Illinois shareholders
who owned ten percent of the stock subject to the offer.3 3 If the Secretary held a hearing, he was required to deny registration to the
offer if it "fail[ed] to provide full and fair disclosure to the offerees
of all material information concerning the take-over offer, or that the
take-over offer [was] inequitable or would work... a fraud or deceit
upon the offerees ...
The Secretary of State was also empowered to bring actions seeking civil penalties for violations of the Illinois Act 35 and criminal prosecutions against individuals who willfully violated the Act. 6
B.

The Factual History

On January 19, 1979, the MITE Corporation3 7 initiated a cash
31. Id. para. 137.57E. The state of Illinois asserted that the purpose of the review by the
Secretary was to determine whether the offer failed to provide full disclosure of material information or would amount to a fraud or deceit on investors. Brief for Appellant at 22, Edgar v.
MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (No. 80-1188). Additionally, the state argued that the
review was not intended to allow the Secretary to evaluate the substantive fairness of the
amount offered. Id. at 21.
32. ILL. REV.STAT. ch. 121 , para. 137.57A (1979) (repealed 1983). This section permitted a request for a hearing to be made by a majority of the target company's "independent" directors or by Illinois residents who held at least 10 percent of any class of equity
securities subject to a tender offer. Id. Although incumbent management was not directly
given the right to request the hearing, it is certainly arguable that they could influence the
"independent" directors or control the requisite number of shares sufficient to request a hearing. See MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 494-95 (7th Cir. 1980), afj'd sub nom., Edgar v.
MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
33. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 , para. 137.57A (1979) (repealed 1983). A hearing could
be requested at any time up to 15 business days after the offeror's registration statement had
been filed with the Secretary. Id. The actual hearing, however, need not have been held until
10 business days after the request was received by the Secretary. Id. para. 137.57C. In addition, the time for the hearing could be extended for the convenience of the parties. Id.
It should be noted that although the hearing provisions were held by the Supreme Court
to permit abuse by creating excessive delay in the tender offer process, see infra notes 69-73
and accompanying text, the Court has failed to acknowledge the possibility that shareholders
could have benefitted from these provisions. As the appellant noted, shareholders would benefit from not being forced into making a hasty decision and would also benefit from the greater
opportunity for receiving a better offer. Brief for Appellant at 20-21, Edgar v. MITE Corp.,
457 U.S. 624 (1982) (No. 80-1188).
34. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 121 , para. 137.57E (1979) (repealed 1983).
35. Id. para. 137.65.
36. Id. para. 137.63.
37. MITE Corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary, MITE Holdings, Inc., were
Delaware corporations with their principal place of business in Connecticut. Edgar v. MITE
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tender offer for all of the outstanding shares of Chicago Rivet &
Machine Company3 8 by filing a Schedule 14D-1 with the Securities
and Exchange Commission in order to comply with the provisions of
the Williams Act."9 MITE did not, however, comply with the provisions of the Illinois Business Takeover Act 40 but instead, on the same
day, commenced litigation in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois asking for a declaratory judgment
that the Illinois Act was preempted by the Williams Act and violated the Commerce Clause."' In addition, MITE Corp. sought a
temporary restraining order and preliminary and permanent injunctions prohibiting the Illinois Secretary of State from enforcing the
Illinois Act.42
On February 1, 1979, the Illinois Secretary of State notified
MITE that he intended to issue an order requiring it to cease and
desist from making further efforts to acquire Chicago Rivet.43 On
February 2, 1979, Chicago Rivet notified MITE that it was filing
suit in Illinois state court to enjoin the proposed offer." On the same
Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 626 (1982).
38. Id. at 627. Chicago Rivet & Machine Co. was a publicly held Illinois corporation.
Id. Of the 2,181 shareholders of record on the offer date, 589 were Illinois residents who
collectively owned approximately 45 percent of the target's outstanding stock. See MITE
Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 488 (7th Cir. 1980), affid sub nom., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457
U.S. 624 (1982). MITE Corporation offered to pay $28 per share for all the outstanding
shares of Chicago Rivet. MITE, 457 U.S. at 628. This price represented a premium of more
than $4 per share above the market price just prior to the announcement of the offer. Id. The
total value of the offer was estimated to be over $23 million. Id. at 629.
39. See infra notes 185-221 and accompanying text (discussing the provisions of the
Williams Act, as well as the purpose behind its enactment).
40. ILL. R.V. STAT. ch. 121 , paras. 137.51-.70 (1979) (repealed 1983). For a full
discussion of the provisions of the Illinois Business Takeover Act, see supra notes 20-36 and
accompanying text.
41. See MITE, 457 U.S. at 628.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 629.
44. Id. Prior to the actions taken in early February, on January 22, 1979, Chicago Rivet
brought suit in Pennsylvania state court, seeking to enjoin MITE from proceeding on the
ground that the offer violated the provisions of the Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 71-85 (Purdon Supp. 1982). Id. at 628. Jurisdiction was based on the
fact that Chicago Rivet conducted most of its business in Pennsylvania. See id. A complaint
was also filed with the Pennsylvania Securities Commission seeking to have the takeover statute enforced against MITE Corp, id. at 628 n.3, but the Commission decided not to enforce
the Pennsylvania law against the proposed offer.
MITE then removed the action commenced by Chicago Rivet in Pennsylvania state court
to the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, which denied
Chicago Rivet's motion for a temporary restraining order. Id. After Chicago Rivet's efforts to
obtain relief in Pennsylvania failed, Chicago Rivet and the Illinois Secretary of State took
steps to invoke the Illinois Act. Id. at 628-29.
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day, however, the United States District Court in Illinois issued a
preliminary injunction prohibiting the Secretary of State from enforcing the Illinois Act."5
On February 5, 1979, MITE published its offer, which was
made to all shareholders of Chicago Rivet residing throughout the
United States." On the same day, Chicago Rivet made an offer for
approximately forty percent of its own shares.4 However, after the
district court entered its final judgment on February 9, 1979, finding
the Illinois Act unconstitutional, MITE and Chicago Rivet entered
into an agreement whereby both offers were withdrawn and MITE
was given thirty days to examine the books and records of Chicago
Rivet.4 After so doing, MITE was either to make a sweetened offer,
which Chicago Rivet agreed not to oppose, or decide not to acquire
Chicago Rivet. 9 On March 2, 1979, MITE announced its decision
not to make the sweetened offer. °
C.

The ProceduralHistory

Subsequent to the preliminary injunction prohibiting the Secretary of State from enforcing the Illinois Act against MITE's tender
offer for Chicago Rivet,51 the district court entered a final judgment
on February 9, 1979, declaring that the Illinois Act was preempted
by the Williams Act and that it violated the Commerce Clause.52
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the District Court's decision, agreeing that several of the provisions
of the Illinois Act were preempted by the Williams Act and that the
Illinois Act unduly burdened interstate commerce in violation of the
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 629.
Id.
Id. Chicago Rivet made a self-tender offer for 40 percent of the company's outstand-

ing stock at $30 per share. Id. Chicago Rivet's self-tender offer was exempt from the provisions of the Illinois Business Takeover Act. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121
(1979) (repealed 1983); see MITE, 457 U.S. at 629 n.3.
48. MITE, 457 U.S. at 629.
49. Id. at 629-30.

2, para. 137.52-9(4)

50. Id. at 630. Although MITE had withdrawn its offer, the Court affirmed the decision
of the Court of Appeals that the case was not moot. Id. The basis of its finding was that
because the Illinois Secretary of State indicated that he still intended to enforce the Act
against MITE, a reversal of the District Court's ruling could possibly expose MITE to civil
and criminal liability. Id.; see ILL REV. STAT. ch. 121 , paras. 137.63 to .65 (1979) (repealed
1983). The Supreme Court noted that such action would be foreclosed by a finding that the
Illinois Act was unconstitutional. MITE, 457 U.S. at 630.
51. See supra text accompanying note 45.
52. MITE Corp. v. Dixon, No. 79 C 200 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 9, 1979), afid, 633 F.2d 486
(7th Cir. 1980), afid sub noma., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
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Commerce Clause. 3 The Illinois Secretary of State appealed the
case to the United States Supreme Court, which affirmed the decision of the Seventh Circuit on June 23, 1982.11
D. The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, 5 upheld the decision of the Seventh Circuit with regard to the Commerce Clause.
The Court held that the Illinois Business Takeover Act conflicted
with the Commerce Clause since it imposed a burden on interstate
commerce that was excessive in light of the local interests the Act
purported to further." In addition, a plurality of the Court 57 held
that the Act's provisions conflicted with, and were thus preempted
by, the Williams Act.58
1. Preemption Under the Williams Act.- The Court first addressed the Seventh Circuit's holding that the Illinois Business Takeover Act substantially frustrated the objectives of the Williams Act 59
in violation of the Supremacy Clause.6 0 The Court concluded that in
enacting the Williams Act, "Congress intended to protect investors" 1 and furthermore that:
Congress intended to strike a balance between the investor,
management, and the takeover bidder. The bidder was to furnish
the investor and the target company with adequate information but
there was no "inten[tion] to do ... more than give incumbent management an opportunity to express and explain its position." 2
53. MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom., Edgar v.
MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
54. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
55. The opinions were divided as follows: Justice White delivered an opinion of which
Parts I, II, and V-B became the opinion of the Court; Chief Justice Burger joined the opinion
in its entirety; Justice Blackmun joined Parts I, II, III and IV; Justice Powell joined Parts I
and V-B; Justices Stevens and O'Connor joined Parts I, II, and V. Justices Marshall, Brennan
and Rehnquist dissented. Id. at 625-26.
56. See id. at 640-46.
57. Parts III and IV of Justice White's opinion addressed the issue of preemption under
the Williams Act in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined. Id. at 625-26;
see supra note 55.
58. See MITE, 457 U.S. at 630-40.
59. See infra notes 185-221 (discussing the provisions of the Williams Act, as well as
the purpose behind its enactment).
60. The Supremacy Clause provides that the Constitution "and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land
.... " U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Any state law which conflicts or interferes with a federal
law is preempted by the federal law. See infra notes 222-30.
61. MITE, 457 U.S. at 633.
62. Id. at 634 (citing Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975)).
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The Court further concluded that once that opportunity was ex-

tended to incumbent management, "Congress anticipated that the
investor, if he so chose; and the takeover bidder should be free to
move forward within the time frame provided by Congress [in the
Williams Act]. '"6

In light of these objectives, the Court identified three provisions
of the Illinois Act that "upset the careful balance struck by Congress
and which therefore [stood] as obstacles to the accomplishment and
'
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. "64
First, the Court found that by providing the target corporation
with additional time within which to take steps to defeat the offer,

the precommencement notification provisions65 furnished incumbent

management with a powerful weapon to defend against a takeover

bid.66 The Court believed that this consequence was precisely what
67
Congress intended to avoid.
Similarly, the Court found that the hearing provisions 68 of the
Illinois Act "frustrate[d] the congressional purpose [of the Williams'
Act] by introducing extended delay into the tender offer process."6 9
63. Id. at 634. The time frame referred to by the Court is the period in which an offeror
can communicate the offer to the target's shareholders upon the filing of a Schedule 14D-1
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). See infra notes 209-22 and accompanying text.
64. MITE, 457 U.S. at 634.
65. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1, paras. 137.54B, 137.54E (1979) (repealed 1983) (requiring the tender offeror to notify the Secretary of State and the target company of its intent to
make an offer and the material terms of that offer 20 business days before the offer became
effective); see also MITE, 457 U.S. at 635; ILL REV. STAT. CH. 121 para. 137.54A (1979)
(repealed 1983) (allowing the target company to disseminate information to its shareholders
concerning the impending offer, while the offeror was prohibited from doing so).
66. MITE, 457 U.S. at 635.
67. Id. The Court butressed this position by referring to the "events leading to the adoption of the Williams Act." Id. The Court noted that Congress had, on a number of occasions,
refused to impose a precommencement disclosure requirement similar to the one contained in
the Illinois Act. Id. at 635-36. In fact, Senator Williams' original bill contained a 20 day
precommencement disclosure requirement which the SEC found "unnecessary for the protection of security holders .
I..."
Id. at 635 (citing 112 CONG. REC.19005 (1966)). Furthermore,
a later bill introduced by Senator Williams, requiring a five day precommencement disclosure
statement to be filed with the SEC was not enacted until "after the elimination of the advance
disclosure requirement." Id. at 636. Finally, Congress rejected another precommencement notification proposal during hearings on the 1970 amendments to the Williams Act. Id. (citing
H.R. 4285, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970)).
68. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 , para. 137.57 (1979) (repealed 1983) (allowing the Secretary of State, the majority of outside directors of the target company, or Illinois shareholders
who own 10% or more of the stock subject to the offer to call a hearing at which the Secretary
of State could determine the fairness of the offer).
69. MITE, 457 U.S. at 637.
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The Court concluded that not only could the Secretary of State indefinitely delay a tender offer, 70 but incumbent management could
also use the hearing provisions to delay the offer. 71 The Court noted
that Congress "recognized that delay can seriously impede a tender
offer" 72 when it enacted the Williams Act. The Court therefore held
that the potential for delay provided by the hearing provisions upset
the balance struck by Congress and conflicted with the Williams
73
Act.
Finally, the Court concluded that the Illinois Act was preempted by the Williams Act since it allowed the Illinois Secretary of
State to pass on the substantive fairness of the proposed tender offer.74 Since the Williams Act was "designed to make the relevant
facts known so that shareholders [would] have a fair opportunity to
make their decision", 5 the statutes obviously conflicted. 6
2. The Commerce Clause.- Although a substantial portion of
Justice White's plurality opinion dealt with the preemption issue, it
was only under the Commerce Clause that a majority of the Court
found the Illinois Business Takeover Act to be unconstitutional.77 In
fact, although Justice White's opinion sets forth two arguments for
concluding that the Act was unconstitutional, only one was em70. See id.; ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121 , para. 137.57 (1979) (repealed 1983). The "indefinite delay" referred to by the Court is the result of the various provisions of paragraph
137.57, which provided that the time for the hearing could be extended by the Secretary of
State for the convenience of the parties. Id. para. 137.57C. There was no limitation on the
duration of the hearings, and although the statute required the Secretary of State to make a
final determination within 15 days after the conclusion of the hearings, that period could also
be extended if it was determined that additional time was necessary. Id. para. 137.57D.
71. MITE, 457 U.S. at 637. The Court reasoned that since, under paragraph 137.57A
of the Illinois Act, a hearing could be called by Illinois shareholders who held at least 10% of
the outstanding shares of any class of equity securities which were the subject of the takeover
offer, incumbent management, which in many cases would control either directly or indirectly
10% of the target company's shares, would be able to delay the commencement of an offer by
insisting on a hearing. See id.; see also supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing the
hearing provisions).
72. MITE, 457 U.S. at 637 (quoting Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d
1256, 1277 (5th Cir. 1975)).
73. Id. at 639. For a discussion of the detrimental effects of delay in the context of
tender offers, see infra note 299 and accompanying text.
74. MITE, 457 U.S. at 639; see ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121 , para. 137.57E (1979) (repealed 1983) (requiring the Illinois Secretary of State to deny registration of an offer if he
finds that the offer "fails to provide full and fair disclosure to the offerees ... or that the takeover is inequitable . . ").
75. MITE, 457 U.S. at 639.
76. See id. at 639-40.
77. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (explaining the breakdown of the
opinions).
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braced by the majority.
The first reason for invalidating the Act on Commerce Clause
grounds was that it imposed "a direct restraint on interstate commerce and ... ha[d] a sweeping extraterritorial effect." 78 The Court

noted that the Commerce Clause has been held to permit only incidental regulation of interstate commerce by the states and prohibits
direct regulation.7 9 Since tender offers for securities of a publicly
held company were ordinarily communicated by the use of some
means of interstate commerce,80 and the acceptance of tender offers
resulted in transactions occurring across state lines, the Illinois statute, by regulating such offers, imposed a direct restraint on interstate commerce."'
The Court also found that the Commerce Clause "preclude[d]
the application of a state statute to commerce that takes place
wholly outside of the [s]tate's borders, whether or not the commerce
has effects within the [s]tate."82 Since the Illinois Act applied to foreign corporations, it could be applied to regulate tender offers which
would not affect a single Illinois shareholder and control conduct beyond the boundaries of the state.8 3 Finally, the Court noted that "if
Illinois may impose such regulations, so may other [s]tates; and interstate commerce in securities transactions would be thoroughly stifled." 84 Part V-A of Justice White's opinion concluded that
"[b]ecause the Illinois Act purports to regulate directly and to interdict interstate commerce, including commerce wholly outside the
State, it must be held invalid ..

.-.

Part B of the Court's Commerce Clause analysis found the Illinois Act unconstitutional under the test enunciated in Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc.,88 which seeks to balance the local interests served by
the statute against the burdens imposed on interstate commerce.8 7
78.

MITE, 457 U.S. at 642.

79. Id. at 640 (citing Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189, 199 (1925)).
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

641.
641-42.
642-43.
642; see ILL REv. STAT. ch. 121

, para. 137.52-10 (1979) (repealed 1983);

supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text (setting forth the conditions for application of the
Illinois statute).

84. MITE, 457 U.S. at 642.
85.

Id. at 643.

86. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
87. The test enuciated in Pike is as follows: "Where the [state] statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce

are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
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The Court found that "the most obvious burden the Illinois Act imposes on interstate commerce arises from the statute's . . . nationwide reach which purports to give Illinois the power to determine
whether a tender offer may proceed anywhere. '88 The Court enumerated the substantial effects of allowing the Illinois Secretary of
State to block a tender offer:
Shareholders are deprived of the opportunity to sell their shares at
a premium. The reallocation of economic resources to their highest
valued use, a process which can improve efficiency and competition,
is hindered. The incentive the tender offer mechanism provides incumbent management to perform well so that stock prices remain
high is reduced.89
Illinois, however, argued that the Illinois Act furthered two legitimate interests: the protection of Illinois security holders9 ° and the
regulation of the internal affairs of companies incorporated under
Illinois law.9 1 The Court found both interests insufficient to outweigh
the burdens imposed on interstate commerce.92
First, the Court noted that although protecting local investors
was a legitimate state objective, the state did not have a legitimate
interest in protecting nonresident shareholders. 93 Furthermore, the
Court noted that since the Act failed to cover self-tender offers,
shareholders in those cases were left only with federal securities laws
"which Illinois views as inadequate to protect investors in other contexts." 4 The Court reasoned that this distinction was "at variance
with Illinois' asserted legislative purpose and tends to undermine [Il'95
linois'] justification for the burdens . . . on interstate commerce.
Second, the Court held that the state's interests in regulating
the internal affairs of a corporation incorporated under its laws was
unpersuasive.98 The Court reasoned that the internal affairs doctrine,
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Id. at 142 (citing Huron Cement Co. v.
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960)).
88. MITE, 457 U.S. at 643.
89. Id. at 643-44 (referring to Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1173-74 (1981); Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation
of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEXAS L. REv. 1, 5, 27-28, 45 (1978)).
90. MITE, 457 U.S. at 644.
91. Id. at 644.
92, Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 645.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol18/iss1/5

12

Campisi: Edgar v. MITE Corp. and CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America: A

1989]

STATE TAKEOVER LEGISLATION

"which recognizes that only one [s]tate should have the authority to
regulate a corporation's internal affairs", 97 was not useful to a state
in the context of a tender offer since "[t]ender offers contemplate
transfers of stock by stockholders to a third party and do not themselves implicate the internal affairs of the target company."98 Furthermore, since the Act applied to corporations not incorporated in
Illinois, the state's "internal affairs" argument was undermined since
Illinois had no interest in regulating the internal affairs of foreign
corporations. 9
III.
A.

CTS

CORP. V. DYNAMICS CORP. OF AMERICA

The Indiana Control Share Acquisitions Chapter

The Indiana Control Share Acquisitions Chapter 10 governs the
voting power of "control shares" of Indiana corporations which are
considered "issuing public corporations".' 0 ' Application of the Indiana Act is further limited' 02 to corporations in which a substantial
97. The internal affairs doctrine "recognizes that only one State should have the authority to regulate a corporation's internal affairs-matters peculiar to the relationships among
or between the corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders-because otherwise a corporation could be faced with conflicting demands." Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 302 comment b (1971)).

98. MITE, 457 U.S. at 645 (citing Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256,
1280 n.53 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nora. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp.,

443 U.S. 173 (1979);

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 302 comment e

(1971)).
99. MITE, 457 U.S. at 645-46.
100. IND. CODE. ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 to -11 (West 1989).
101. For the purposes of the Business Corporation Law, including the Control Share
Acquisitions Chapter, the term "corporation" is defined as "a corporation for profit that is not
a foreign corporation, incorporated under or subject to the provisions of this Article." IND.
CODE ANN. § 23-1-20-5 (West 1989). The Seventh Circuit also acknowledges that the Control
Share Acquisitions Chapter only applies to corporations "incorporated in Indiana." See Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 260 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other
grounds, 481 U.S. 69 (1987); see also IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-49-5(c) (West 1989) (stating
"[t]his article does not authorize Indiana to regulate the organization or internal affairs of a
foreign corporation authorized to transact business in Indiana.").
102. Brief for Intervenor-Appellant at 10-11, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,
481 U.S. 69 (1987) (No. 86-97) [hereinafter Brief for Intervenor-Appellant]. It should be
noted that a strong argument exists that regulating the voting rights of shares purchased in a
tender offer is, in essence, the same as regulating the purchase, sale or transfer of those shares.
Voting rights, after all, are an integral part of the ownership interest purchased
along with a stock certificate. By limiting the rights that a tender offeror can
purchase in a control acquisition, the Indiana Act deprives the transaction of all
value and therefore blocks the transaction in practical terms as much as would a
direct prohibition on control acquisitions.
Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 637 F. Supp. 389, 398 (N.D. Ill.), afJfd, 794 F.2d
250 (7th Cir. 1986), revd, 481 U.S. 69 (1987). For a full presentation of this argument, see
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number of shares are held by, or a substantial number of shareholders are, Indiana residents. 0 3 Control shares are defined as shares acquired 04 by an entity which, when added to all other shares of the
corporation owned by the acquiror,105 would bring its voting power
in the corporation, but for the operation of the Act, past one of three
threshold levels: 20%, 33.3%, or 50%.1108 A person who acquires
control shares may not vote them until the shares are granted voting
rights by a majority of the existing disinterested shareholders. 0
To obtain the requisite shareholder vote, any person or entity
who proposes to make or who has made an acquisition of control
shares may, at that person's election, deliver to the target corporation an "acquiring person statement",10 8 and at the time of delivery
may request a special shareholders meeting for the purpose of determining whether voting rights will be granted.10 9
Infra notes 292-311 and accompanying text.
103. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-4(a)(3) (West 1989) (requiring the corporation to have
either: (A) more than 10% of its shareholders resident in Indiana; (B) more than 10% of its
shares owned by Indiana residents; or (C) 10,000 shareholders resident in Indiana); see also
Id. § 23-1-42-4(b) (stating "[t]he residence of a shareholder is presumed to be the address
appearing in the records of the corporation.").
104. The statute applies regardless of the method by which the shares are acquired;
whether by tender offer or by open market or private purchases. See id. § 23-1-42-2.
105. Only the control shares themselves (the shares purchased which raise the aggregate
amount above one of the three threshold levels), and not shares previously owned by the acquiror, are subject to the provisions of the statute. Id. § 23-1-42-1.
106. Id.
107. Id. § 23-1-42-9(a) (defining interested shares as shares with respect to which the
acquiror, an officer or an inside director of the corporation "may exercise or direct the exercise
of the voting power of the corporation in the election of directors."); see also Brief for Intervenor-Appellant, supra note 102, at 29 (stating "ihe Indiana Legislature did not intend that
incumbent management be permitted to vote on the voting rights issue.").
108. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-6 (West 1989). The acquiring person statement must
set forth the following information:
(1) the identity of the acquiring person;
(2) a statement that the acquiring person statement is made pursuant to this
chapter;
(3) the number of shares owned by the acquiring person;
(4) the range of voting power under which the control share acquisition falls; and
(5) if the control share acquisition has not yet taken place:
(a) a reasonable description of the terms of the proposed acquisition; and
(b) certain representations of the acquiring person concerning the legality of
the acquisition and the financial capacity to make the acquisition.
Id.
109. Id. § 23-1-42-7(a). The request for the special shareholder's meeting must be accompanied by a promise of the acquiring person to pay the corporation's expenses to hold such
meeting. Id.
If the request is made, the directors of the issuing corporation shall call the special shareholder's meeting within ten days of that request, id., set a record date, id. § 23-1-42-8(a), and
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If the shareholders of the issuing corporation do not confer voting rights to the acquired shares, the target corporation may, at its
election, redeem the control shares from the acquiror at the fair
market value, but it is not required to do so. 110 Similarly, if the acquiror does not submit an acquiring person statement, the issuing
corporation may redeem the shares at any time after sixty days following the acquiror's last purchase, provided the corporate bylaws or
articles of incorporation allow it to do so."'
Finally, in the event that control shares are accorded full voting
rights and the acquiring party has acquired control shares with a
majority or more of all voting power, all shareholders of the issuing
corporation have dissenter's rights and may receive fair value for
their shares.' 1 2
B.

The FactualHistory

The Dynamics Corporation of America (DCA) began acquiring
CTS Corporation (CTS) common stock in 1980118 due to CTS' prior
earnings performance and its excellent growth prospects." 4 By 1981,
hold the shareholder's meeting within fifty days after receipt of the acquiring person statement. Id. § 23-1-42-7(b). Such meeting, however, must not be held sooner than thirty days
after receipt of the acquiring person statement. Id. § 23-1-42-7(d).
If no request is made, the issue of voting rights to be accorded the shares shall be
presented at the next special or annual meeting of the shareholders. Id. § 23-1-42-7(c).
110. Id. § 23-1-42-10(b).
111. Id. § 23-1-42-10(a).
112. Id. § 23-1-42-11. The Indiana Business Corporation Law contains an entire chapter
entitled "Dissenters' Rights". Id. §§ 23-1-44-1 to -20. This chapter allows a shareholder who is
entitled to dissent from a corporate action and who exercises that right, to obtain payment of
the fair value of his shares. Id. § 23-1-44-8; see also id. § 23-1-42-11. A shareholder is entitled
to dissent from a number of corporate actions including the approval of a control share acquisition. Id. § 23-1-44-8(a)(5); see also id. § 23-1-42-1 l(a). The board of directors must, as soon
as practicable after shareholder approval, send notice to all shareholders of the corporation
advising them of the fact that they have dissenter's rights. Id. § 23-1-44-12; see also id. § 231-42-11(b). The dissenter's notice must be sent no later than 10 days after the shareholder
approval and must: (1) state where demand for payment must be sent and when and where
shares must be deposited; (2) supply a form for demanding payment; (3) set a date by which
the corporation must receive the demand for payment; and (4) be accompanied by a copy of
this chapter. Id. § 23-1-44-12(b). The fair value to be received means a value not less than the
highest price paid per share by the acquiring person in the control share acquisition. Id. § 231-44-3; see also id. at § 23-1-42-11(c).

113. DYNAMICS CORPORATION
ter 1986 DCA ANNUAL REPORT].

OF AMERICA,

1986

ANNUAL REPORT

2 (1987) [hereinaf-

114. Id. In the years 1976, 1977, 1978 and 1979, CTS had reported yearly pretax earnings of over $20 million. Id. During the same period net earnings as a percent of shareholders'
equity ranged from 11.5% to as high as 17.8%. Id.
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however, CTS had become an attractive takeover target.. 5 since the

corporation had undergone a change in management which had resulted in a series of ill-fated corporate decisions detrimental to
CTS."6e DCA continued investing in CTS, believing it could be "a
significant and supportive investor of CTS and make positive contributions to its continued growth," 117 and by 1986 had decided that
"the basic core of CTS' business still had strength and [DCA] possessed the talents to return CTS to its rightful position as a profitable leader .. if new philosophies and disciplines ... were directing

the forward progress of CTS." 18
By early 1986, DCA" 9 had increased its ownership interest to
approximately 9.7 %120 of the common stock of CTS.' 21 On March
10, 1986, DCA announced a cash tender offer for an additional one
115. See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 3, at 1-12. These authors note the
following characteristics they consider to play an important role in determining the attractiveness of a potential takeover target:
[1] the price/earnings ratio;
[2] significantly lower or declining earnings when compared with competition;
[3] surplus liquid assets;
[4] concentrated share ownership;
[5] asset size; and
[6] other characteristics including (most relevant to this case):
[a] nominal debt and contingent liabilities;
[b] declining dividends (earnings per share]; and
[c] an absence of strong leadership in management.
Id.
116. 1986 DCA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 2. During the period 1981
through 1986 CTS' new management made a series of ill-considered corporate acquisitions,
some of which ended in large operating losses while others were folded completely. Id. at 2-3.
Printex Corp., one of the CTS acquisitions, resulted in an $18 million write-off due to its
disposition. Id. at 2-3. The detrimental effects of the acquisitions are further evidenced by the
net operating losses of $2.5 million in 1984 and $13.1 million in 1986. Id. at 3. During the
same period CTS also went from a company having no long term debt to a company with over
$41.3 million of long term debt by the end of 1986. Id. at 2-3.
117. Id. at 2. In the years just prior to the tender offer, DCA had been gradually increasing its ownership interest in CTS, from 8.3% to 9.2% in 1984, and from 9.2% to 9.5%
by January, 1985. Id. at 14.
118. Id. at 3.
119. DCA is a New York corporation with its principal place of business in Greenwich,
Connecticut. Brief for Intervenor-Appellant, supra note 102, at 19; see also 1986 DCA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 1.
120. DYNAMICS CORPORATION OF AMERICA, 1985 ANNUAL REPORT 12 (1986) [hereinafter 1985 DCA ANNUAL REPORT]. As of January 28, 1986, DCA owned 554,600 of the
approximately 5.8 million CTS shares outstanding. Id. at 12. The market value of the DCA
investment in CTS at that time was $19.8 million. Id.
121. CTS Corporation is an Indiana corporation with its principal place of business in
Elkhart, Indiana. Brief for Intervenor-Appellant, supra note 102, at 8.
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million shares of CTS, 12 2 which would raise its ownership interest to
approximately 27.5 %.123 DCA's intention was to increase its investment in CTS in order to conduct a proxy contest,' 24 with the objective in hope that the nominees for the board of directors chosen by
DCA would be elected by the shareholders of CTS, who would then
return the company to profitability.' 2 5
On the same day DCA announced its tender offer, it also filed
suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois,"' seeking injunctive relief under section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.127 The complaint alleged non-compliance
with SEC rules "and misrepresentations in connection with the sending of proxy solicitations".2
Approximately one week earlier, on March 4, 1986, Indiana enacted a new business corporation law 1 29 which contained a chapter
entitled "Control Share Acquisitions.' 30 Although the new law became applicable to all Indiana corporations on August 1, 1987,11
corporations could elect to be governed by its provisions prior to that
date. 32 On April 1, 1986, CTS elected to be governed by the new
122. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 75 (1987). The cash
tender offer was for 1,000,000 shares of common stock of CTS Corp. at $43 per share. 1986
DCA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 14.
123. CTS, 481 U.S. at 75; 1986 DCA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 14. On
April 24, 1986, DCA purchased the additional 1,000,000 shares through its offer raising its
aggregate holdings to 1,554,600 of the approximately 5,657,000 CTS shares outstanding. Id.
The market value of the DCA investment in CTS as of December 31, 1986 was approximately
$50.1 million. Id.
124. Brief of Intervenor-Appellant, supra note 102, at 8. On March 10, 1986, DCA also
announced a proxy contest to elect its own candidates to the CTS board of directors at CTS'
annual meeting on April 25, 1986. Id; see also 1985 DCA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 120,
at 16.
125. 1986 DCA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 2. CTS resisted the DCA proxy
effort made in March, 1986, and was successful in defending its incumbent management. Id.
at 3.
126. See Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 637 F. Supp. 389 (N.D. Ill.), affid,
794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), revd, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
127. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982).
128. CTS, 637 F. Supp. at 390.
129. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-17-1 to 23-1-54-2 (West Supp. 1987); see CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 72 (1987).
130. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 to -11; see CTS, 481 U.S. at 72. For a complete
discussion of the provisions of this chapter, see supra notes 100-12 and accompanying text.
131. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-17-3(a) (West Supp. 1987).
132. Id. § 23-1-17-3(b) (requiring the corporations' board of directors to adopt by resolution that the provisions of the Indiana Act should apply to their corporation and that the
resolution must specify a date on which the provisions will apply and must be filed with the
secretary of state before that date).
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law, 33 and DCA then amended its complaint to challenge the constitutional validity of the Indiana Act. 34
C. The ProceduralHistory
On April 9, 1986, the district court ruled that the Williams Act
preempted the Indiana Act and granted DCA's motion for declaratory relief.'13 The court held that the Indiana statute "wholly frustrates the purpose and objective of Congress in striking a balance
between the investor, management and the takeover bidder in takeover contests," as embodied in the Williams Act." 6
On April 17, 1986, the district court issued a second opinion
regarding the validity of the Indiana Act under the Commerce
Clause. 137 The court held that "the substantial interference with in133. Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp. 637 F. Supp. 389, 391 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd,
794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
134. Id. The amended complaint not only challenged the constitutional validity of the
Indiana Act, but also sought to preliminarily enjoin a shareholder rights plan adopted by the
CTS board on March 22, 1986, for the admitted purpose of warding off DCA's hostile tender
offer. Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 637 F. Supp. 406, 407 (N.D. II1. 1986).
Although the decision on this matter is not directly relevant to the constitutional validity of the
Indiana Act, this decision, as well as the one reached in Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS
Corp., 635 F. Supp. 1174 (N.D. I11.
1986) (concerning the adoption of a second defensive plan
by the CTS board, namely a "white knight" shareholder rights plan), are relevant to the potential detrimental effects of the Indiana statute in relation to the provisions of the Williams
Act. For a complete discussion of this topic, see infra notes 307-11 and accompanying text.
135. Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 637 F. Supp. 389 (N.D. I11.), affid, 794
F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481 U.S. 69 (1987). For purposes of this section the procedural history discussion will be limited to the holdings of the courts below with regard to the
constitutional issues.
136. Id. at 399.
137. Id. at 400. The Indiana Attorney General had not been properly certified pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2403(b) (1982). CTS, 637 F. Supp. at 400. The statute requires that:
in an action in a United States court to which a State is not a party thereof, wherein
the constitutionality of any statute of that State affecting public interest is drawn
into question, the court shall certify such fact to the attorney general of the State,
and shall permit the State to intervene for presentation of evidence and for argument on the question of constitutionality.
28 U.S.C. § 2403(b) (1982).
Because of this failure, the district court limited its original discussion to the Williams
Act challenges. CTS, 637 F. Supp. at 400. CTS then moved to certify the April 9, 1986
opinion for immediate appeal. Id. The district court was concerned that if the Court of Appeals reversed, it would simply remand for resolution of the Commerce Clause issue. Id. Instead, it decided to rule on the alternative grounds despite the State's failure to intervene,
providing a record whereby the entire controversy over the effectiveness of the Indiana statute
could be definitively resolved on appeal. Id. The appeal was then certified to the Indiana Attorney General, thereby giving it the opportunity to intervene at the appellate level. Id. (citing
Merrill v. Town of Addison, 763 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that for purposes of
section 2403(b), certification can be satisfied at the appellate level).
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terstate commerce created by the [Act] outweighs the articulated
local benefits so as to 38create an impermissible indirect burden on
interstate commerce."'
CTS appealed the district court's holding on these claims to the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 9 On April 23, 1986, the
court of appeals issued an order affirming the judgment of the district court. 40 CTS then appealed the case to the United States Supreme Court, which reversed the order of the Seventh Circuit on
April 21, 1987.141
D. The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court, by a six to three majority, 142 reversed the
138. CTS, 637 F. Supp. at 406.
139. Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd,
481 U.S. 69 (1987).
140. See id. The decision by the Seventh Circuit was issued just six days after the district court's second ruling, and only 23 days after DCA had first contested the application of
the Indiana Act. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 76 (1987). The
reason for the rapid disposition of the case was due to the imminence of the CTS annual
meeting and the question of DCA's ability to vote the shares acquired through the tender offer
at that meeting. See id.
141. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
Just prior to the decision by the Supreme Court, DCA and CTS reached an agreement
resolving all outstanding differences between the two companies. See 1986 DCA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 19; CTS CORPORATION, 1986 ANNUAL REPORT at 16 (1987) [hereinafter 1986 CTS ANNUAL REPORT]. As indicated earlier, the proxy contest waged by DCA in
March, 1986 was unsuccessful. See supra note 125. By late 1986, DCA was considering another proxy contest, but by December, 1986, discussions began between DCA and CTS which
resulted in the aforementioned agreement. 1986 DCA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 113, at
19. Under the plan, CTS agreed to cease soliciting offers to purchase all or a part of the
company. Id. On March 4, 1987, the Board of Directors of CTS was reduced from 8 to 7
members and three representatives of DCA were elected to the board. Id. Furthermore, the
CTS board was to recommend to the CTS shareholders at the 1987 annual meeting proposals
in favor of (i) paying approximately $2.2 million to DCA as reimbursement for costs and
expenses related to the proxy fight for CTS; and (ii) granting DCA the option to purchase
shares of CTS common stock with the condition that DCA's ownership interest would not
exceed 35%. Id. CTS and DCA also exchanged releases and dismissed with prejudice all
pending litigation between them, except the agreement provided that the voting rights of the
shares acquired by DCA through the tender offer would ultimately be governed by the outcome of the U.S. Supreme Court decision regarding the Indiana Act. Id. Finally, the agreement provided that approval by an 80% vote of the CTS board was required for amendments
to the CTS bylaws, changing the date of the CTS annual meeting, adopting shareholder rights
plans, changing the size of the CTS board, or the soliciting of proxies by DCA or CTS. Id. If
80% of the board could not agree on the 1988 slate of directors, both sides would be free to
solicit proxies for the 1988 meeting with CTS, agreeing not to interfere with DCA's efforts in
that regard. Id.
142. CTS, 481 U.S. at 71. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor joined. Id. Justice
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order of the Seventh Circuit and held that the Indiana Control
Share Acquisitions Act is consistent with the provisions of the Williams Act, 4 3 and that it does not violate the Commerce Clause since
the Act's limited effect on interstate commerce is justified by the
state's interest in its domestic corporations. 4 4
1. Preemption Under the Williams Act.- In deciding the preemption issue under the Williams Act; 4 5 the Court used its prior
decision regarding the Illinois Business Takeover Act 4" in Edgar v.
MITE Corp.14 7 as a reference point in comparing the provisions of
the Indiana Act.' 48 The Court found the Indiana Act differed in major respects from the Illinois statute and used those distinctions to
overcome the preemption argument. 4 9
The Court began with the premise that a significant purpose of
the Williams Act is to strike a careful balance between the interests
of the offeror and the target company and to place investors on equal
footing with the offeror in order to protect them from the coercive
aspects of tender offers. 150 The Court reasoned that since the Indiana
Scalia filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment. Justice White filed a
dissenting opinion, Part II (relating to the Commerce Clause) of which Justices Blackmun and
Stevens joined. Id.
143. See id. at 78-87 (discussing whether the Williams Act preempts the Indiana Act).
144. See id. at 87-94 (discussing whether the Indiana Act violates the Commerce Clause
of the United States Constitution).
145. See infra notes 185-221 and accompanying text (discussing the background and
provisions of the Williams Act).
146. See supra notes 20-36 and accompanying text (discussing the operation of the Illinois Business Takeover Act).
147. 457 U.S. 625 (1982); see supra notes 37-99 and accompanying text (discussing
MITE). See generally Comment, State Takeover Statutes Under Attack-Casualties in the
Battle for Corporate Control-MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 30 DE PAUL L. REV.989 (1981) (authored by Richard Ryndack) (examining the threat the MITE decision could pose to state
takeover laws).
148. See CTS, 481 U.S. at 81. The Court stated the following:
As the plurality opinion in MITE did not represent the views of a majority of the
Court, we are not bound by its reasoning. We need not question that reasoning,
however, because we believe the Indiana Act passes muster even under the broad
interpretation of the Williams Act articulated ... in MITE.
Id. (footnote omitted).
149. See id. at 80 (stating "[tihe Indiana Act differs in major respects from the Illinois
statute that the Court considered in Edgar v. MITE Corp.... ).
150. Id. at 82-83. The Court discussed the coercive aspects of tender offers using the
following example:
If . . . shareholders believe that a successful tender offer will be followed by a
purchase of nontendering shares at a depressed price, individual shareholders may
tender their shares-even if they doubt the tender offe.r is in the corporation's best
interest-to protect themselves from being forced to sell their shares at a depressed
price.
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Act allows shareholders to act as a group in the corporation's best
interests, it serves to protect shareholders from this type of coercion
by permitting them to reject the offer by voting not to confer voting
rights on the acquiror. 151 By protecting shareholders of Indiana corporations from this type of coercion, the Court concluded that152the
Indiana Act furthered the federal policy of investor protection.
Additionally, the Court noted that the policy of balancing the
target's interests with those of the offeror is not upset by the Indiana

Act since it "does not give either management or the offeror an
advantage in communicating with the target company's
shareholders."'

53

The Court next addressed the possibility of delay brought about
by the Indiana Act.'

The Court found that the Indiana Act does

Id. at 83. The State of Indiana offers a more detailed description of the effect:
Tender offers are frequently structured as partial or two-tier offers with cash for an
initial percentage of the corporation's shares and a later component of consideration
of questionable value for the remaining shares ....
In many partial or two-tier offers, the initial premium offered to shareholders is
substantial, but the second is considerably lower, resulting in an overall premium
that is unfavorable to shareholders ... [and] individual shareholders are likely to
reason that it is in their own best interest to tender their shares.
Brief of Intervenor-Appellant, supra note 102, at 91-92 (citations omitted). For a complete
discussion on the topic of coerciveness in the tender offer process see Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1693 (1985);
Bradley, Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control, 53 J. Bus. 345
(1980); Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations:The Case Against Defensive Tactics
in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981); Jarrell, Brickley & Netter, The Market for
Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. ECON. PERsP. 49 (1987); Jensen
& Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J.FIN. EcON. 5
(1983); Romano, The PoliticalEconomy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111 (1987);
see also Two-Tier Tender Offer Pricing and Non-Tender Offer Purchase Programs-Advance
Notice of Possible Commission Action, Exchange Act Release No. 21079, [1984 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,637 (June 21, 1984).
151. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-9 (West 1989) (indicating voting rights can only be
conferred by a resolution approved by a majority of the shareholders of the issuing corporation); see also CTS, 481 U.S. at 84 (stating "the Act allows shareholders to evaluate the
fairness of the offer collectively." (emphasis in original)); supra notes 100-12 (discussing the
operation of the Indiana statute).
152. CTS, 481 U.S. at 83.
153. Id. Compare IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-6(b) (West 1989) (requiring that notice of
the meeting must include a copy of the offeror's statement along with a statement by the
target's board of directors) with ILL. REV.STAT. ch. 121 1, para. 137.57A (1979) (repealed
1983) (allowing the target company's management to disseminate information concerning the
offer to its shareholders while the offeror is precluded from doing so).
154. See CTS, 481 U.S. at 84-86. It is important to remember that one of the offensive
features of the Illinois Act struck down in MITE was the fact that it could potentially allow
for an indefinite delay in the tender offer process. See supra notes 65-73 and accompanying
text.
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not impose an absolute fifty day delay on tender offers, 15 5 nor does it
preclude the offeror from acquiring the tendered shares as soon as
the Williams Act permits.156 In addition, the Court pointed out that
an offeror who is apprehensive that the shares will not receive voting
rights can make a conditional tender offer, offering to accept shares
only on the condition that voting rights will be conferred within a
157
specified period of time.
The Court also noted that even if the Act does impose some
additional delay on tender offers, the additional delay is not sufficient
to create a conflict with the Williams Act.' 58 The Indiana Act allows
voting rights to be vested (assuming a positive shareholder vote)
within fifty days after the commencement of the offer, well within
the sixty day maximum period provided by Congress.' 59
Finally, the Court observed that if the Williams Act were interpreted to preempt any state statute that limited or delayed the unobstructed exercise of power after the consummation of a tender offer,
it would render other state corporate laws invalid. 160 Such a broad
interpretation, the Court believed, would be erroneous. 6 '
2. The Commerce Clause.- The Court then addressed the possibility that the Indiana Act violated the Commerce Clause. 2 The
Court began its analysis by asserting that "[t]he principal objects of
. . .Commerce Clause scrutiny are statutes which discriminate
155. CTS, 481 U.S. at 84. Compare IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-7(b) (West 1989) (requiring the special meeting of shareholders to be held within 50 days after receipt by the
issuing corporation of the request for such meeting) with ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1h, para.
137.57A (1979) (repealed 1983) (allowing the Illinois Secretary of State to call a hearing on
the offer and prohibiting the offer from going forward until the hearing, which could be indefinitely prolonged, was complete).
156. CTS, 481 U.S. at 84.
157. Id. The Court noted that the Williams Act permits tenders offers to be conditioned
on the jiurchaser obtaining regulatory approval and saw "no reason to doubt that this type of
conditional offer would be legitimate as well." Id. at 84-85.
158. Id. at 85. The Court stated that "nothing in MITE suggested that any delay imposed by state regulation ... would conflict with the Williams Act. The plurality argued only
that the offeror should 'be free to go forward without unreasonable delay.'" Id. (citing Edgar
v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 639 (1982) (emphasis added)).
159. CTS, 481 U.S, at 85 (stating "[w]e cannot say that a delay within that congressionally determined period is unreasonable.").
160. Id. The Court noted that state corporate laws normally permit corporations to stagger the terms of directors and provide for cumulative voting. Id. at 85-86. They then argue
that both these types of provisions may act to delay the ability of the offeror to gain control of
the corporation. Id. at 86.
161. See Id.
162. Id. at 87-94.
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against interstate commerce." 163 The Court held that the Indiana
Act does not discriminate against interstate commerce since it has
the same effects on both in-state and out-of-state offerors. 6 In addition, even though the statute may apply mostly to out-of-state entities, nothing in the Indiana Act places a greater burden on out-of65
state offerors than on in-state offerors.1
The second step of the Court's analysis found that the Commerce Clause also works to invalidate state laws which adversely affect interstate commerce by causing certain activities to be subject to
inconsistent regulations."8 6 Again, the Court found that the Indiana
statute did not pose such a problem, reasoning that "[s]o long as
each State regulates voting rights only in the corporations it has created, each corporation will be subject to the law of only one
State.""" Therefore, the Court concluded that the "Indiana Act
does not create an impermissible risk of inconsistent regulation by
different States.' 6 8
The Court turned to the Seventh Circuit's opinion, which found
that the Indiana Act had a direct and substantial adverse affect on
out-of-state tender offers." 9 That finding was based on the Pike balancing test, which seeks to balance the state's interest against any
adverse effects the state statute may have on interstate commerce.'7 0
The majority believed that the Seventh Circuit "failed to appreciate
the significance for Commerce Clause analysis of the fact that state
regulation of corporate governance is regulation of entities whose
very existence and attributes are a product of state law.'' x17 In defining the state's interests, the Court noted that it is a necessary part of
the corporate governance for states to enact laws which regulate corporate activities, and such regulation must necessarily affect certain
163. Id. at 87 (citing Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 36-37 (1980);
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)).
164. Id. at 87.

165.

Id. at 88. The Court determined that "[t]he fact that the burden of a state regula-

tion falls on some interstate companies does not, by itself, establish a claim of discrimination

against interstate commerce." Id. (citing Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117,
126 (1978)).
166. Id. (citing Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 774 (1915)).
167. Id. at 89.
168.

Id.

169.

Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 264 (7th Cir. 1986),

rev'd, 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (holding "[t]he law in question is an explicit regulation of tender

offers.").
170.

See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); supra note 87 (setting

forth the Pike balancing test).
171.

CTS, 481 U.S. at 89.
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aspects of interstate commerce.1 72 The Court concluded that it "is an
accepted part of the business landscape . . . for [s]tates to create
corporations, to prescribe their powers, and to define the rights that
are acquired by purchasing their shares,' 173 and that "[a] [s]tate
has an interest in promoting stable relationships among parties involved in the corporations it charters, as well as in ensuring that investors . . . have an effective voice in corporate affairs."' 4
Since the primary purpose of the Indiana Act is to protect the
stockholders of Indiana corporations,1 5 and this purpose is achieved
by allowing shareholders to decide collectively whether the change in
management is in the best interests of the corporation,1 6 the Court
believed "it is well within the [s]tate's role as overseer of corporate
governance to offer this opportunity,' 7 7 and to protect shareholders
from the coercive aspects of tender offers. 78 It is this interest of protecting shareholders of Indiana corporations through corporate governance that the Court weighed against the adverse effects on interstate commerce.
For the purposes of its analysis, the Court noted only two potentially adverse effects on interstate commerce. First, DCA had argued
that a state has "'no legitimate interest in protecting the nonresident
shareholders.' "'n1 The Court rejected this contention, however, by
asserting that since the Indiana Act only applies to Indiana corporations, and every application of the statute will affect a significant
number of Indiana residents, the only transactions affected by the
statute are, in essence, in-state transactions. 80 Second, the Court addressed DCA's argument that the Act will limit the number of successful tender offers, holding that there is little evidence that this
will result from the Indiana Act. 8 ' The Indiana Act does not pre172. Id. at 89-90.
173. Id. at 91.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 91-92.
177. Id. at 90.
178. Id. at 90-91.
179. Id. at 93 (citing Brief for Appellee at 21, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (No. 86-7 1) (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644
(1982)).
180. Id. at 93. The Court's decision is based on the finding that the Illinois statute
struck down in MITE applied to foreign corporations as well as domestic corporations. Id.; see
MITE, 457 U.S. at 644. Since Illinois had no interest in protecting non-residents and the
statute adversely affected interstate commerce, "there [was] nothing to be weighed in the balance to sustain the law." Id.
181. CTS, 481 U.S. at 93.
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elude any resident or non-resident entity from purchasing shares in
Indiana corporations.18 2 Furthermore, since the state may define the
attributes of the corporations and its stock, and so long as the Indiana Act provides that residents and non-residents have equal access
to them, there is no Commerce Clause violation. 3 The Court concluded that "[to the limited extent that the Act affects interstate

commerce, [it] is justified by the [s]tate's interests in defining the
attributes of shares in its corporations and in protecting
shareholders. '8 4
IV.
A.

THE WILLIAMs ACT

The Background of the Act

Until 1968, the year the Williams Act'8 5 went into effect, cash
tender offers were for the most part unregulated.' 86 As the use of
tender offers dramatically increased, Congress was compelled to address the abuses that accompanied them. Although the proponents of
tender offers recognized that the device served legitimate business
and economic purposes, 87 the opponents of the technique portrayed
182. See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
183. CTS, 481 U.S. at 93.
184. Id. at 94.
185. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982)).
186. See Sowards & Mofsky, Corporate Take-Over Bids: Gap in Federal Securities
Regulation, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 499, 504-05 (1967) (noting that prior to the passage of the
Williams Act, shareholder relief related to cash tender offers was limited tcations under
sections 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 1Ob-5).
187. See generally Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership and in Corporate
Takeover Bids: Hearings on S.510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Hayes) [hereinafter
Hearings on S.510] (setting forth various reasons for the increased use of tender offers). For a
complete discussion of the benefits which result from the tender offer process, see Easterbrook
& Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1982) (advocating
a no auction rule in the tender offer process because of the possibility of increased wealth to
investors and society even though auctions may raise the price in a tender offer); Easterbrook
& Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and Shareholder Welfare, 36 Bus. LAW. 1733
(198 1) (analyzing the use of defensive tactics by management in response to a tender offer and
concluding that defensive tactics are harmful to a target company's shareholders); Easterbrook
& Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94
HARV. L. REv. 1161 (1981) (arguing that the prospect of a tender offer leads to more efficient
management); Easterbrook & Jarrell, Do Targets Gain from Defeating Tender Offers?, 59
N.Y.U. L. REV. 277 (1984) (presenting studies which provide evidence that management tactics to defeat tender offers negatively effect the benefit to shareholders); Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control and the Regulation of Cash Tender
Offers, 57 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1978) (finding that state and federal regulations that hinder the use
of tender offers lessen the incentive of incumbent management to perform efficiently); Gilson,
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it as a tool for corporate raiders in their quest to sack and pillage
"proud old companies. 188
As the congressional hearings progressed, and convincing evidence of the benefits served by the tender offer process was
presented, 18 9 the focus of the legislation changed from one of protecting incumbent management to one of providing "full and fair
disclosure for the benefit of stockholders while at the same time providing the offeror and management equal opportunity to fairly present their case." °°
The "full and fair disclosure" requirement sought to address the
problems tender offers presented for the individual investor.' These
problems included the secrecy involved in the tender offer process,' 92
and the undue pressure shareholders might experience, forcing them
to act hastily and to accept the offer before any other group had an
A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981) (addressing the tension in tender offers between management's desire to retain control and shareholders' wish to obtain the highest price for their
stock); Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulations of Cash
Tender Offers, 23 J. L. & ECON. 371 (1980) (concluding that federal and state regulation of
tender offers benefits shareholders by way of increased tender premiums).
188. See 111 CONG. REc. 28257-60 (1965) (remarks of Sen. Williams); 113 CONG.
REc. 857-58 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Kuchel). For a complete discussion of this position, see
Herzel, Schmidt & Davis, Why Corporate Directors Have a Right to Resist Tender Offers, 61
CHI. B.REc. 152 (1979); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101
(1979); Steinbrink, Management's Response to the Takeover Attempt, 28 CASE W. REs. L.
REV. 882 (1978).

189. See Hearings on S.510, supra note 187, at 56-57. Studies presented at the Congressional hearings indicated that the majority of successful tender offerors did not liquidate
the acquired company. Id. at 56. In addition, the Hearings indicated that the typical target of
a takeover bid was a company which was relatively unprofitable and excessively liquid in the
period preceeding the tender offer. Id. at 56-57.
190. 113 CONG. REC. 854-55 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams). Senator Williams
stated:
I have taken extreme care with this legislation to balance the scales equally to protect the legitimate interests of the corporation, management, and shareholders without unduly impeding cash takeover bids. Every effort has been made to avoid tipping the balance of regulatory burden in favor of management or in favor of the
offeror.
Id. at 854; see also Piper v. Chris Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977) (holding that the
sole purpose of the Williams Act is investor protection).
191. See Note, The Constitutionality of State Takeover Statutes: A Response to Great
Western, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 872, 876 (1979) (citing SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, FULL DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE EQUITY OWNERSHIP AND IN CORPORATE TAKEOVER BIDS, S. Rep. No. 550, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1967)).

192. See H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cpng., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1968). Prior to the passage of
the Williams Act a tender offeror was not required to disclose his identity, the source of his
funds, his equity in the target company, or what he intended to do with the target company in
the event he gained control. Id.
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opportunity to present opposing arguments or competing offers.193
Through full and fair disclosure, investors would be provided sufficient information so that they might arrive at an informed invest194
ment decision.
A major aspect of this attempt to protect the investor was to
avoid favoring either management or the offeror.19 5 The basis for
this concern was to prevent incumbent management from being helpless in its ability to resist a takeover,196 yet not provide incumbent
management with a weapon to be used to defeat takeover attempts

and discourage takeover bids." 7
For these reasons, Congress adopted a policy of "evenhandedness . . . [which] represented a conviction that neither side in the

contest should be extended additional advantages vis-a-vis the investor, who if furnished with adequate information would be in a position to make his own informed choice."' '
B.

The Major Provisions of the Act

The Williams Act 199 added sections 13(d) and (e) and sections
14(d), (e) and (f) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.200 The
Act was amended in 1970,201 and at present regulates tender offers
193. See Hearingson S.510, supra note 187, at 17. The crux of this problem was that a
shareholder who hesitated in tendering his shares might miss the opportunity to sell his shares
since a bidder was under no obligation to purchase more than the minimum number of shares
stated in the offer which were purchased on a first come-first served basis. Id. Furthermore, if
the shareholder tendered his shares immediately he would thereby be precluded from accepting a better offer later. Id.
194. See 113 CONG. REc. at 854-55 (remarks of Sen. Williams) (stating "[t]he purpose
of this bill is to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of stockholders . . . " so that the
stockholder can make an informed decision as to whether or not to accept a tender offer).
195. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
196. See Note, supra note 147, at 994 n.26.
197. See Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975) (noting that Congress, when enacting the Williams Act, "intended to do no more than give incumbent management an opportunity to express and explain its position.").
198. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 633-34 (1982) (citation omitted).
199. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
200. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1982 &
Supp. V 1987).
201. See Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1497. The Act was
amended to provide additional protection for investors and includes:
(1) a reduction in the percentage of stock ownership needed to trigger the disclosure requirements of the Act from ten percent to five percent;
(2) an extension of the Act to cover exchange tender offers;
(3) an extension of the Act to cover tender offers for insurance companies; and
(4) rule making power for the SEC.
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in five areas: (1) disclosure in connection with certain stock acquisitions; (2) purchases by a corporation of its own stock; (3) tender
offers; (4) fraud in connection with tender offers; and (5) changes in
majority directors. 0 2
1. Disclosure in Connection with Five Percent Acquisitions.Section 13(d) requires that any person,20 3 acquiring beneficial ownership 04 of an equity security20 5 in excess of five percent must disclose certain information within ten days to the SEC, to each exchange where the security is traded, and to the issuer of the
security. 206 The section also requires an amendment to be filed if any
See E. ARANOW & H.

EINHORN,

supra note 3, at 68.

202. The scope of this Note is limited to the regulation of tender offers; specifically, the
relevant areas are: (1) the disclosure requirements of persons acquiring more than 5% of certain classes of equity securities under section 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982); and (2) the
regulation of tender offers under section 14(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1982).
203. For purposes of the 1934 Act, the term "person" is defined as "a natural person,
company, government or political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of a government." Id.
§ 78c(a)(9) (1982). The Williams Act further provides that "two or more persons act[ing] as
a partnership, limited partnership, syndicate, or other group for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities of an issuer... shall be deemed a 'person'....." Id. § 78n(d)(2)

(1982).
204. The term "beneficial owner" under the Williams Act means any person who has
the right to determine how stock is to be voted. See Bath Indus. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97, 112 (7th
Cir. 1970); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3 (1987).
205. The Williams Act applies to any equity security: (1) of a class registered pursuant
to section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; (2) of an insurance company which
would have been required to register except for the exemption provided by section 12(g)(2)(G)
of the 1934 Act; or (3) issued by a closed-end investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(d) (1987).
206. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(a) (1987). Schedule 13D
requires that the following information be disclosed:
(1) the identification of the issuer and the class of equity security to which the
statement relates;
(2) the identity and background of the person filing the statement;
(3) the source and amount of funds to be used in the acquisition;
(4) the purpose of the transaction;
(5) the person's current interests in the issuer or its securities;
(6) any contracts, arrangements, understandings or relationships which exist
with respect to the securities of the issuer;
(7) exhibits containing material including proposals relating to: (a) borrowings
to finance the acquisition; (b) acquisition of control, liquidation, sale of assets, mergers, changes in the business or corporate structure; and (c) the
transfer or voting of the securities, finder's fees, options, guarantees, or
proxies.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1987). Certain acquisitions of stock need not be registered
under section 13(d) if: made by means of a registration statement under the 1933 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78m(d)(6)(A) (1982); made by the issuer of the stock, id. § 78m(d)(6)(C); or if the
acquisitions made during the preceeding 12 months do not exceed two percent of the class. Id.
§ 78m(d)(6)(B). The SEC may also exempt any acquisition which was not made for the pur-
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material changes occur in the facts set forth in the original
statement. °
2. Regulation of Tender Offers.- Section 14(d) requires any
person who uses the mails, any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or any facility of a national securities exchange to
make a tender offer for an equity security to file a Schedule 14D-1
containing information required by Section 13(d)20 8 with the SEC no
later than the time the offer is first published or sent to security
holders, if after consummation of the offer that person would be the
beneficial owner of more than five percent of that security.2 9 All
material information included in Schedule 14D-1 must also be disseminated to shareholders along with the date for withdrawal and
the date for proration. 210 Anyone other than the person filing the
Schedule 14D-1 who solicits or recommends a position regarding the
tender offer must file a Schedule 14D-9 with the Commission.2 '

Section 14(d) and its accompanying rules additionally provide
substantive protection for the investor.21 2 First, stockholders who
tender their shares may withdraw them during the first seven days of
a tender offer 213 and, if the offeror has not purchased them, at any
pose of changing or influencing the control of the issuer. Id. § 78m(d)(6)(D).
207. Id. § 78m(d)(2); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2(a) (1987). This provision requires the
amendment to be filed with the Commission and transmitted to the issuer and the exchange.
15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(2) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2(a) (1987).
208. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982); see supra note 206.
209. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3 (1987).
210. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-6(e)(v) & (vi)
(1987).
211. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(4) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9 (1987). Schedule 14D-9
requires that the following information be disclosed:
(1) the identification of the target company and the security sought;
(2) the identification of the bidder and the tender offer;
(3) the identity and background of the party filing the statement;
(4) the solicitation or recommendation;
(5) the identity of persons employed by the person filing the statement to make
solicitations or recommendations to the security holders;
(6) recent transactions and the intent with respect to those securities;
(7) any negotiations or transactions undertaken with the target company;
(8) any other material information; and
(9) exhibits, including: (a) a copy of the solicitation or recommendation; (b) a
copy of any contract, agreement, arrangement or understanding between
the filing party and the target; and (c) copies of any proxy statement, report or other communications.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101 (1987).
212. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1 to .14d-101 (1987).
213. The statute allows only seven days to withdraw an offer. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5)
(1982). However, the period was subsequently extended to fifteen days. See 17 C.F.R. §

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1989

29

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 5

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:157

time after sixty days from the commencement of the offer.214 This
provision was intended to give the investor time to change his mind
and prevent the offeror from tying up the securities for an indefinite
period.21 5 Moreover, the offer must remain open for at least twenty
business days.216
Second, if more shares are tendered than the offeror sought to
acquire, purchases must be made on a pro rata basis from each
tendering shareholder.21 7 The underlying reason is that allowing an
investor to reach his or her decision increases the likelihood of an
informed and intelligent investment decision.21 8
Finally, if the terms of the offer are changed before its expiration, any increase in consideration must be paid to all tendering
shareholders, including those who already received payment for their
tendered shares. 2 9 This provision insures that all shareholders will
be treated equally regardless of when they decided to accept the
220
offer.

It is important to note that the Williams Act also contains a
broad antifraud provision which prohibits the use of false or misleading statements and fraudulent or manipulative devices by either the
offeror, the target company's management, or by any other individual in connection with a tender offer.22 '
V.

COMMENTS AND ANALYSIS

A.

The Williams Act

1. Identifying the Problem.- The Supreme Court has developed three categories to determine whether state legislation must
240.14d-7(a)(1) (1986). But see infra note 214.
214. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7 (1986). Although these pro-

visions existed at the time of MITE and CTS, as of 1987 any person who has deposited securities pursuant to a tender offer has the right to withdraw those securities during the entire

period that the offer remains open. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7 (1987).
215. See 113 CONG. REC. 856 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams); see also H.R. REP.
No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1968).
216. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1987). This section is included under the antifraud provisions of the Williams Act and was designed to prevent fraudulent, deceptive and manipula-

tive practices within the meaning of section 14(e). Id. § 240.14e-1.
217. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1987).
218. See 113 CONG. REC. 856 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams); H.R. REP. No. 1711,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1968).

219.

15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (1987).

220. See 113 CONG. REc. 856 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams); H.R. REP. No. 1711,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1968).
221. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 to .14e-3 (1987).
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yield to federal law under the Supremacy Clause. The first and most
obvious category of preemption is where it is apparent from a federal
statute, its legislative history, or the widespread acceptance of the
federal scheme that Congress intended to occupy the field. 22 The
Williams Act, which amends the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,223 does not expressly prohibit states from regulating take-

overs. 2 4 Therefore, it has been noted that Congress simply left the
determination of whether a state law conflicts with the Williams Act
to the courts on a case-by-case basis. 25

Secondly, courts will find federal preemption where a state stat-

ute directly conflicts with a valid federal law, 26 or where "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility .... "227 Since there was neither direct conflict nor impossibility
of compliance with either the Illinois or Indiana statutes and the
Williams/Act,228 the Supreme Court in MITE and CTS turned to
the thir4 category to determine the validity of each of these statutes.
Under the third category of preemption, a state law will be invalida d if it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and executiofi of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. ' 229 Thus, the
issue identified by the Court in both MITE and CTS, in seeking to
determine the validity of the state takeover statute, was whether the

provisions of the statute frustrated the purposes and objectives of the
222. See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973)
(holding that, in light of the pervasive nature of the scheme of federal regulation of aircraft
noise, state law was preempted); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) (noting that the
scheme of federal regulation in the Smith Act is so pervasive that Congress left no room for
the states to supplement).
223. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
224. See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982). When Congress amended the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 to include the Williams Act, it did not amend section 28(a) which provides:
"Nothing in this title shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission (or any agency
or officer performing like functions) of any State over any security or any person insofar as it
does not conflict with the provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder."
Id.
225. See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp. 457 U.S. 624, 632 (1982).
226. See, e.g., Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962) (finding that treasury regulations
conflicted with Texas community property law).
227. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
228. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 79 (1987) (stating that
"[b]ecause it is entirely possible for entities to comply with both the Williams Act and the
Indiana Act, the state statute can be pre-empted only if it frustrates the purposes of the federal law."); MITE, 457 U.S. at 631-32 (stating that "[o]ur inquiry is further narrowed in this
case since there is no contention that it would be impossible to comply with both the provisions
of the Williams Act and the more burdensome requirements of the Illinois law.").
229. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
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Williams Act.230
Since MITE and CTS are thus far the only two cases in which
the Supreme Court of the United States has ruled on the constitutionality of state takeover legislation under the Supremacy Clause, it
has become commonplace for federal and state courts to turn to the
"purpose" analysis first enunciated in MITE, and followed in CTS,
when analyzing the provisions of the statute being challenged in the
seemingly continuous attack on state takeover legislation . 23a The
problem, however, is that the purpose analysis adopted in MITE2 2
and seemingly reinforced in CTS,2 aa does not limit itself to the purpose of the Williams Act. 234 Instead, it evaluates the statute by commingling the means adopted to accomplish that purpose and a
court's characterization of those means as either furthering or frustrating the concept of investor protection. 5 When formulating this
purpose analysis, the MITE Court commingled the concepts of purpose and the means by which that purpose should be accomplished.236 While each substantive provision of the Williams Act may
have an individual "purpose" that it seeks to accomplish, 237 those
purposes should not be confused with the overall purpose of the legislation. By interpreting substantive provisions of the Williams Act
to be definitive guidelines by which the overall purpose of investor
230. CTS, 481 U.S. at 79; MITE, 457 U.S. at 632.
231. See, e.g., Hyde Park Partners v. Connolly, 839 F.2d 837 (Ist Cir. 1988) (challenging the Massachusetts Takeover Bid Regulation Act); BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp.
458 (D. Del 1988) (questioning the validity of § 203 of the Delaware General Corporation
Law); Batus, Inc. v. McKay, 684 F. Supp. 637 (D. Nev. 1988) (challenging the Nevada Takeover Act); RP Acquisition Corp. v. Staley Continental, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 476 (D. Del. 1988)

(questioning the validity of § 203 of the Delaware General Corporation Law); Veere Inc. v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 685 F. Supp. 1027 (N.D. Ohio 1988) (attacking the Ohio Con-

trol Share Acquisition Act).
232. See MITE, 457 U.S. at 630-40.

233. See CTS, 481 U.S. at 79. The Court began its preemption analysis by stating that
although "the plurality opinion in MITE did not represent the views of a majority of the Court
...[w]e need not question that reasoning ... because we believe the Indiana Act passes
muster even under the broad interpretation of the Williams Act articulated ... in MITE." Id.
at 81. The Court continued by analyzing the provisions of the Indiana statute using the same

analysis employed in the MITE decision. Id. at 81-87.
234.

See infra notes 237-75 and accompanying text.

235. See supra notes 59-76, 145-61 and accompanying text (discussing the Supremacy
Clause analysis in MITE and CTS).
236.

Id.

237. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (purpose of the 60 day provision is to prevent the
bidder from tying up an investor's shares indefinitely); id. § 78n(d)(6) (purpose of the pro rata
provision is to alleviate the fear that the later shares tendered in excess of the amount stated in
the offer will be rejected); id. § 78n(d)(7) (purpose of the increased price provision is to assure

equal treatment of all tendering shareholders).
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protection should be accomplished, the Court has expanded the purpose analysis beyond the scope of purpose itself. Instead, the Court
has limited a state's ability to further the concept of investor protection by limiting the means by which a state can seek to accomplish
that goal.2"8
The expansion of the purpose of the Williams Act as well as the
limitation on the instrumentalities employed by a state is readily apparent from the Court's rejection of the Illinois statute in MITE.2 39
Despite the plurality opinion in MITE, the Illinois Act can be characterized as a statute which furthered the sole purpose and objective
of the Williams Act by seeking to protect investors.2 40
If one accepts the premise that the Williams Act was designed
to protect investors through full and fair disclosure, 24 1 the registration requirement of the Illinois Act arguably complements this legislative scheme by requiring additional disclosure,24 2 imposing administrative review on the adequacy of that disclosure 243 and extending
the period of public scrutiny of the offer.2 4 Thus, the Illinois Act
would provide shareholders with additional information enabling
them to make an intelligent and more informed decision as to
whether to accept or reject an offer.2 45
Despite this additional protection, the plurality opinion objected
to the fact that the registration statement had to be filed twenty business days before the offer became effective,2 46 a requirement rejected by Congress when it adopted the Williams Act.247 Further238. See infra notes 242-80 and accompanying text.
239.

MITE, 457 U.S. at 624; see supra notes 59-76 and accompanying text.

240. See infra notes 242-80 and accompanying text.
241.

See supra notes 190-95 and accompanying text (discussing the protection sought by

the full and fair disclosure requirement).
242. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 , para. 137.54C (1979) (repealed 1983); see supra note
27 and accompanying text (describing the registration requirement).

243.

ILL.

REV. STAT.

ch. 121

, paras. 137.57-.58 (1979) (repealed 1983); see supra

notes 31-34 and accompanying text (discussing administrative review provisions).

, paras. 137.57-.58 (1979) (repealed 1983).

244.

ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 121

245.

See Brief for Appellant at 8, 17-23, Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982)

(No. 80-1188) [hereinafter MITE Appellant Brief]; see also Brief for the State of Ohio as
Amicus Curiae at 5-6, Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (No. 80-1188) [hereinafter

MITE State of Ohio Brief] (arguing that the Ohio and Illinois Acts share a mutual purpose;
that is, effectively complementing the Williams Act by benefitting shareholders, as well as

protecting investors).
246. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 634-36 (1982); supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing these provisions of the Illinois Act).
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more, the Court believed that this precommencement period upset
the balance established by Congress by favoring incumbent' manage248
ment and "frustrating the objectives of the Williams Act.
The mere fact that Congress considered, but refused to adopt an
advance notice requirement, does not establish that the inclusion of
such a provision in the Illinois Act conflicts with the objectives of the
Williams Act.24 9 If the purpose of the Williams Act is investor protection,250 the precommencement period, if used to protect investors,
does not conflict with that objective. In addition, the Court's determination that the precommencement period frustrated the objectives
of the Williams Act, by providing the target company with additional time to take defensive measures,2 51 rests on the assumption
that one of the purposes of the Williams Act was to create neutrality
or to strike a particular balance between takeover bidders and
targets, 5 2 which may not be accurate.
At the outset, any conclusion that a purpose of the Williams
Act was to create neutrality is immediately suspect because courts
and commentators have concluded that the actual purpose was investor protection. 53 The Williams Act, as enacted, imposed both disclosure requirements and delay burdens on the takeover bidder and
therefore was not neutral. 2 " In fact, it has been argued that the Williams Act indicated a legislative choice to favor incumbent management as a way of increasing investor protection.255 Furthermore, the
argument that a purpose of the Williams Act was to strike a particular balance with regard to tender offers has been questioned. 56
All federal legislation can be said to strike a particular balance,
yet that balance does not constitute legislative purpose. The "balance" analysis should only be used to preempt state laws where Con248. MITE, 457 U.S. at 635 (emphasis added).
249. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 360 (1976).
250. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977) (holding that the sole purpose of the Williams Act is investor protection).
251. MITE, 457 U.S. at 635-36.
252. See supra notes 61-73 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose analysis in
the MITE decision).
253. See Piper, 430 U.S. at 35 (noting that the sole purpose of the Williams Act is
investor protection); see also Fischel, supra note 187, at 27 (concluding that the Williams
Act's shareholder protection purpose has been realized); Jarrell & Bradley, supra note 187, at
372 (discussing the William's Act's protection for target shareholders).
254. See supra notes 186-220 and accompanying text.
255. See Jarrell & Bradley, supra note 187, at 404.

256. See Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 261-62 (7th Cir.
1986), rev'd, 481 U.S 69 (1987) (questioning the reasoning of MITE which suggested that
Congress intended to strike a particular balance between the target and the takeover bidder).
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gress provided that states were precluded from striking any other
balance. No such provision exists with regard to the Williams Act.2"
Even if it did, it would not be a basis for preemption under a purpose
analysis. Regardless, even if it is found that Congress was committed
to a policy of neutrality in contests for corporate control, its policy of
evenhandedness does not go to the purpose of the legislation. Neutrality between management and the bidder is just one characteristic
directed toward the purpose of investor protection.2 58
The Illinois Act can also be said to have enhanced investor protection through the provisions allowing for administrative hearings
and review.2 59 The express purpose of the administrative hearings
was to determine if the offer failed to provide full disclosure of material information or would work a fraud or deceit on investors.2 60
Fraudulent and deceptive practices were defined in the realm of disclosure rather than the substantive fairness of the offer. 2 1 This evaluation period can be said to create sufficient time within which a
shareholder could access the disclosure statements in order to reach
an informed decision.26 2 It would have prevented spur of the moment,
decisions by shareholders in response to an offer made at a substantial premium, without first having an adequate opportunity to evaluate the terms of the offer.263 If, however, a shareholder sought to
make an immediate profit on the target's securities in the open market during the offering period, the Act did not preclude him from so
doing. 2 4 Finally, management could use the extended period to solicit competing bids or negotiate a higher bid from the takeover
bidder.2 65
The Court, however, noted two problems with the provisions allowing for administrative review. First, the plurality opinion noted
257.

See infra notes 266-78 and accompanying text (analyzing the purpose analysis in

MITE).

258. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 29 (1977); Hyde Park Partners v. Connolly, 839 F.2d 837, 850 (1st Cir. 1988) (quoting Piper, 430 U.S. at 29); see also Edgar v.

MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 646-47 (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that incidental protection of
local management does not contradict the Williams Act neutrality policy).
259. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (discussing the administrative hear-

ing provisions).
260. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
261. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 121 , para. 137.58 (1979) (repealed 1983).
262. See MITE Appellant Brief, supra note 245, at 17-23; MITE State of Ohio Brief,
supra note 245, at 6-11.
263. See MITE Appellant Brief, supra note 245, at 22-23; MITE State of Ohio Brief,

supra note 245, at 9-10.
264.
265.

See MITE State of Ohio Brief, supra note 245, at 10.
See MITE Appellant Brief, supra note 245, at 21.
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that the hearing provisions frustrated the congressionally determined
purpose of "neutrality" and the concomitant objective of allowing
"investors and the takeover offeror ... to go forward without unrea-

sonable delay" 2 6 by introducing extended, and possibly infinite delay
into the tender offer process.2 6 7 Delay, it felt, may have prevented
shareholders from accepting, within a reasonable time, a tender offer
they considered fair within a reasonable time and might also have a
chilling effect on the use of tender offers, thereby denying shareholders the right to sell their shares at a premium.268 Secondly, insofar as
the statute enabled the Secretary of State to pass on the substantive
fairness of the proposed offer, the statute was preempted since Congress intended for investors to be free to make their own decisions. 26 9
As previously noted, the notion that the Williams Act sought to
create "neutrality" or to strike a particular balance is inherently suspect.2 Yet, even if one accepts these concepts as a possible policy of
the Williams Act, they do not go to the purpose of the legislation. At
most, they indicate a means by which Congress sought to implement
its objective of investor protection and as such are irrelevant with
regard to a purpose analysis under the Supremacy Clause.
At the outset, the Court's concern with the possibilty of indefinite delay was purely speculative since the record contained no evidence of the actual effect of the Illinois statute.27 1 However, if in
fact the Illinois Act did impose additional delay into the tender offer
process, the Court should not have been concluded that such a result
"[stood] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress''272 since investor protection

was actually furthered. The Court reasoned that the congressional
objective of investor protection may be diminished if shareholders
are denied the opportunity to sell their shares at a premium.2 7 a But
this reasoning is based on the assumption that investor protection
could only be accomplished through the right of offerors to make
266. MITE, 457 U.S. at 639.
267. See supra notes 59-76 and accompanying text (discussing the practical applications
and effects of the hearing provisions).
268. See MITE, 457 U.S. at 633.
269. Id. at 639-40.
270. See supra notes 253-58 and accompanying text.
271. See MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 497 (7th Cir. 1980), affd sub nom.,
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (stating that "any conclusion as to the actual
effect (the Illinois Act] has had, or may have, on tender offers in Illinois would be purely
speculative because the record is devoid of evidence on that subject.")
272. MITE, 457 U.S. at 631.
273. Id. at 633-34.
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successful tender offers.274 This is not the case. Shareholders must
often be protected from unfair and coercive tender offers that are
obviously not in their best interests, 2 5 and the success of all tender
offers could not possibly have been a purpose of the Williams Act.
Finally, the Court's argument that the provision of the Illinois
statute-which allowed the Secretary of State to pass on the substantive fairness of the proposed offer-frustrates the objectives of
the Williams Act, entirely ignores the express purpose of the hearing
provisions as well as the defined terms of the Act.27 However, even
if the Court believed that the Secretary of State could rule on the
substantive fairness of the offer, it failed to show how this stood as
an obstacle to the congressional purpose of investor protection. In
fact, by holding that the hearing provisions conflicted with the congressional intent of allowing "investors to be free to make their own
decisions", 77 the Court further expanded the "purpose" of the Williams Act to include the concept of investor autonomy.278
The foregoing analysis merely seeks to demonstrate that the
Court has unnecessarily expanded the purpose of the Williams Act
274. MITE, 633 F.2d at 496 (arguing that giving an advantage to management will
deny the shareholder the possibility of selling the shares at a premium).
275. See CTS, 481 U.S. at 82-84 (discussing the possibility of post-tender offer shareprice depression); see also 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS & FREEZEOUTS §
6.09[3] (1978) (discussing fairness to non-tendering shareholders); Bebchuk, supra note 150,
at 1696 (noting that "[s]hareholders' decisions whether to tender in the face of a takeover bid
are at present subject to substantial pressures and distortions."); Herzel, Schmidt & Davis,
supra note 188, at 154-56 (relating the right of corporate directors to resist tender offers to the
protection of shareholders); Lipton, supra note 188, at 114 (arguing that shareholder referendums are futile to appraise the merits of a tender offer); Steinbrink, supra note 188, at 896
(concluding that a corporation's management can make more rational decisions to accept or
decline tender offers than shareholders).
276. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 , paras. 137.57-.58 (1979) (repealed 1983). The
hearing provisions of the Illinois Act entitled the Secretary of State merely to determine if the
offer "fail[ed] to provide full and fair disclosure of all material information concerning the
take-over offer, or that the take-over offer is inequitable or would work or tend to work a fraud
or deceit upon the offerees". Id. para. 137.57E. The standards provided by this paragraph
which enabled the Secretary of State to deny registration did not go to the "substantive fairness" of the offer. See MITE Appellant Brief, supra note 245, at 15, 17-21. "Full and fair"
disclosure was clearly defined by the registration requirements of the Act which could easily be
satisfied by the offeror. ILL REV. STAT. Ch. 121 , para. 137.54C. In addition, the Act also
defined what conduct would constitute fraudulent and deceptive practices. Id. para. 137.58.
Therefore, the Secretary of State could only deny registration based on a violation of one or
more of the Act's objective standards, and not on a finding that the offer was not substantively
fair.
277. MITE, 457 U.S. at 639.
278. Id. at 639-40 (noting that the legislative history supports an intent to put each
shareholder in a position to make a well-informed decision).
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by interpreting substantive provisions of that Act as being indicative
of the overall legislative purpose.2 79 As a result, this Note argues
that the determination of the constitutional validity of state takeover
statutes now depends on a court's characterization of that statute's
substantive provisions. Since the provisions of the Illinois Act could
be characterized as "directly conflicting" with the provisions of the
Williams Act,280 such an expansive approach to the purpose and
objectives of the Williams Act was needless and, in fact, may have
delayed the arrival of investor protection through state takeover legislation until the Court's decision in CTS.
The Court in CTS was clearly presented with an opportunity to
rein in the expansive view of the purpose analysis it first enunciated
in MITE. Unfortunately, by adhering to the reasoning of the plurality opinion in MITE, the Court actually weakened the persuasiveness of its own argument. If the Court had simply concluded that the
Indiana Act furthered the congressionally determined purpose of investor protection, its reasoning would appear much more convincing
than it does in light of the guidelines developed in MITE.
The CTS Court believed that allowing shareholders to vote as a
group furthered the concept of investor protection.2"' This conclusion, however, ignores some very relevant and practical consequences
of this provision which arguably conflict with the neutrality objective
announced in MITE. It is widely accepted that most shareholders
are passive investors who have little interest in, and little incentive to
learn, the details of corporate management.28 2 Passive shareholders
want to be told whether to sell or hold their shares and they want
management to take the appropriate action to maximize the value of
279. See CTS, 481 U.S. at 81 (referring to the "broad interpretation of the Williams
Act articulated . . . in MITE"). See generally Comment, supra note 147, at 989 (examining
the decision in MITE and the issue of whether the Williams Act preempts Illinois takeover

laws).
280.

Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121

, para. 137.54E (1979) (repealed 1983) (pro-

viding for a 20 day precommencement period) with 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) (1987) (provid-

ing that "a public announcement by the bidder ...

shall be deemed to constitute the com-

mencement of a tender offer ....
).
281. See, e.g, CTS, 481 U.S. at 82-84; see supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text

(discussing the Court's interpretation of shareholder protection).
282. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 89, at 1171. These authors reason that no
shareholder can really benefit from monitoring the firm's management since any benefit would
be dispersed among all of the company's stockholders according to the size of their investment,

and not according to their efforts. Id. Since all shareholders can take a free ride on any one
stockholder's efforts, it is in their own self-interest to remain passive. Id.; cf. Dynamics Corp.
of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 254 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481 U.S. 69 (1987)
(noting that many "shareholders are passive investors").
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their stock.28 3 For this reason, shareholders routinely vote for management and pay little or no attention to the issues of shareholder

votes.284 As a result, successful campaigns against incumbent management are rare.28 5 It follows that by allowing disinterested shareholders to vote collectively, the provisions of the Indiana Act may
actually give incumbent management a distinct advantage in the
tender offer process 28 6 contrary to the asserted objective of the Williams Act.287
However, the Court concluded in CTS that investors need to be
protected from the coercive aspects of tender offers. 28 The Court's
argument that the shareholder vote serves to protect investors from

the coercive aspects of tender offers rests on the assumption that of
the total number of shares tendered pursuant to a tender offer, the
28 9
majority of those shares will be tendered as a result of coercion.
This assumption entirely ignores any profit motive of individual investors and the effect the premium has on the decision to tender

shares.290 It is widely held that the majority of investors who buy
stock are motivated by one basic objective-to make a capital investment and get back their money plus a return on that investment. 29 1
283. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 89, at 1171. (stating that shareholders "want to
be told whether they should sell their shares now or wait for a better offer to come along.
Better yet-for it is difficult to absorb information about a subject you don't know much
about-they want management to create a process that will maximize the value of their shares
in a takeover situation.").
284. Id. at 1170-71.
285. Id. The authors believe that this result is simply a product of the concept of passive
investment. Id. Since each shareholder realizes that his ability to affect the outcome of any
corporate issue is practically nonexistent unless he owns a large block of stock, the shareholder's self-interest leads him to ignore the issues. Id. It follows that if the majority of
shareholders share this feeling, management will normally prevail. Id.
286. See supra notes 282-85 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 196-99 and accompanying text (discussing the policy of evenhanded treatment).
288. CTS, 481 U.S. at 82-84; see also Brief for Intervenor-Appellant, supra note 102, at
91-95; supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
289. See supra note 150 (discussing the shareholders desire to avoid facing depressed
stock prices).
290. See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 3, at 30-31; Easterbrook & Fischel,
supra note 89, at 1161.
291. See B. MANNING, A CONCISE TEXTBOOK ON LEGAL CAPITAL 8 (2d ed. 1981) (contending that the one basic objective of investors who buy stock is to receive the highest possible
return on their capital investment); Booth, Management Buyouts, Shareholder Welfare, and
the Limits of FiduciaryDuty, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 641 (1985) (noting that shareholders as
passive investors seek the greatest possible return on their investment); Burgman, Reappraising the Role of the Shareholder in the Modern Public Corporation:Weinberger's Procedural
Approach to Fairnessin Freezeouts, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 593, 636 (1984) (making reference to
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Therefore, assuming the majority of shares are not tendered as a
result of coercion, the shareholder vote may actually harm individual
investors by denying them the opportunity to sell their shares at a
premium. The practical effect of the Indiana Act may be to deter
tender offers from being made, in clear conflict with the "purpose"
of the Williams Act developed in MITE.
The Court, however, found that the Indiana Act does not prevent an offeror from purchasing shares as soon as permitted under
federal law.292 This argument is premised on the belief that a purchaser will spend millions of dollars to acquire shares that are worthless for the purpose of exercising control. The Court totally ignored
the practical effects of the statute. 93 As the District Court noted:
"[v]oting rights . . . are an integral part of the ownership interest

purchased along with a stock certificate. By limiting the rights that a
tender offeror can purchase in a control acquisition, the Indiana Act
deprives the transaction of all value and therefore blocks the transaction in practical terms . ... -94
It is difficult to understand how the Court could hold that removal of voting rights from shares does not have the practical effect
of blocking a "voting rights" transaction.29 5 If the Court looked to
the substance of the transaction rather than its form,296 it would
have seen that the Indiana Act had the potential of blocking the
the characterization of public shareholders as passive investors whose "sole expectation is the
best possible return on [their] investment"); Steinberg, The Securitiesand Exchange Commission's Administrative, Enforcement, and Legislative Programs and Policies-TheirInfluence
on CorporateInternal Affairs, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 173, 202 (1982) (stating that "shareholders undeniably are primarily interested in obtaining the maximum economic return on
their investments"); Comment, The Union Judgment Rule, 54 U. Ci. L. REV. 980, 988
(1982) (authored by Bruce A. Herzfelder & Elizabeth E. Schriever) (noting that "[a]ll shareholders in a publicly held corporation have a common goal-to maximize the return on their
investment); Comment, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 72 VA. L. REV. 851, 856 (1986)
(authored by James F. Ritter) (stating that "[s]hareholders are concerned mainly with receiving a satisfactory return on their investment.
292. CTS, 481 U.S. at 84.
293. See CTS, 481 U.S at 100 (White, J., dissenting) (stating "[t]he majority ignores
the practical impact of the Chapter ....

).

294. Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 637 F. Supp. 389, 398 (N.D. ILL.), affid,
794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
295. See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 3, at 70. These authors note that the
tender offer process, as a means for acquiring corporate control, is only effective if the offeror
is able to vote the shares it has acquired. Id.
296. Cf. CTS, 481 U.S. at 99 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[t]his Court is not
bound by '[t]he name, description or characterization given [a challenged statute] by the legislature or the courts of the State,' but will determine for itself the practicalimpact of the law."
(quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) (emphasis added)).
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transaction as did the Illinois statute in MITE.9 7
The Court rejected this contention by reasoning that if a tender
offeror fears an adverse shareholder vote, it can simply make a conditional tender offer, offering to purchase shares on the conditon that
they receive voting rights within a specified time.2 a However, this

solution, which gives the offeror the ability to purchase shares at a
later date, creates another conflict with the Williams Act as identified in MITE because it imposes additional delay into the tender
offer process.29 In the case of a conditional tender offer, the purchaser still does not gain control of the shares until fifty days after
the commencement of the offer.300 This leaves management in place
for three extra weeks with "free reign to take . . . defensive
steps . ..
o"301
This arguably would have an effect similar to the

precommencement period and create the possibility of delay which
resulted from the hearing provisions that were struck down in
MITE.30 2 The CTS Court, however, rejected this contention, saying
297. See CTS, 637 F. Supp. at 398.
298. CTS, 481 U.S. at 84-85. The Court noted that the SEC "does not appear to have
spoken authoritatively on this point", but believes "[t]here is no reason to doubt that this type
of conditional tender offer would be legitimate as well." Id. at 84 n.8.
299. In the realm of tender offers, delay has been characterized as a potent weapon in
the tender offer fight. See Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation:Interests, Effects, and
Political Competency, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 213, 238 (1977); see also Wachtell, Special
Tender Offer Litigation Tactics, 32 Bus. LAW. 1433, 1437-42 (1977). By providing a substantial delay, incumbent management is afforded the opportunity to take defensive measures in its
quest to thwart the offer. See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 3, at 219-76. The
defensive tactics available to the target include:
A. Repurchases of its own shares by the target;
B. Open-market purchases of the target's shares by friendly third parties;
C. Concentrated selling of the offeror's shares by friendly third parties;
D. Dividend increases;
E. Stock splits;
F. Issuance of additional shares;
G. Creation of incompatibility between the target and the offeror;
H. Defensive mergers;
I. Discriminatory voting provision;
J. Triggering of state takeover statutes;
K. Legal action;
L. Publicity; and
M. Restrictive loan agreements.
Id.

300. See

IND. CODE ANN.

§ 23-1-42-7 (West 1989).

301. CTS, 481 U.S. at 85 n.9 (quoting Brief for Appellee at 37, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (No. 86-97)).
302. MITE, 457 U.S. at 636-37. The MITE Court, relying on the congressional record
leading to the adoption of the Williams Act, indicated that Congress refused to impose a
precommencement period since it "furnished incumbent management with a powerful tool to
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it is "unlikely" that management will take such action.3 03 Secondly,
the Court noted that even if this problem existed, it did not control
the preemption analysis since "[n]either the Act nor any other federal statute can assure that shareholders do not suffer from the mismanagement of corporate officers and directors."3 04
At this point, the Court seems to have ignored the evidence in
the case. It is apparent from the record that CTS management tried
three times to protect itself from the DCA offer.30 5 In addition, although it may be true that no federal law can protect shareholders
from corporate management, that is not the issue with preemption
purpose analysis. According to the analysis in MITE, what is at issue is a state law that "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
. . .of the full purposes and objectives of Congress"3 0 6 by providing
for an extended delay in the tender offer process.
Finally, the CTS Court reasoned, that even if the Indiana Act
did impose some additional delay, the MITE opinion did not suggest
that delay would necessarily create a conflict with the Williams
Act-only an unreasonable delay would do so. 30 7 The Court concluded that the fifty day delay produced by the Indiana statute was
not unreasonable since it was within the sixty day maximum period
combat tender offers" and thereby frustrated the objectives of the Williams Act. Id.
303. CTS, 481 U.S. at 85 n.9.
304. Id.
305. See Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 637 F. Supp. 406, 407-08 (N.D.
ill.), aff'd, 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481 U.S. 69 (1987). After DCA announced its
tender offer for CTS stock and its intent to wage a proxy contest, CTS management adopted a
number of defensive tactics "for the admitted purpose of warding off DCA's hostile tender
offer." Id. at 407.
On March 22, 1986, CTS' board of directors adopted a shareholder rights plan under
which CTS shareholders received a dividend distribution of one right per share. Id. The right
entitled the holder to purchase a unit of CTS securities, which consisted of stock and debt,
should any person or group acquire 15% or more of CTS' common stock. Id. The effects of
this plan was to inflict an immediate economic loss on the acquiring party which, according to
CTS, would have caused a loss of approximately $24 million to DCA. Id. at 408.
On April 23, 1986, CTS management adopted a second shareholder rights plan as a part
of a white knight strategy. Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 635 F. Supp. 1174,
1176-77 (N.D. Ill.
1986). This plan would force any party seeking to acquire 28% or more of
CTS' common stock to pay shareholders a minimum of $50 per share. Id. at 1177. The purpose of this plan was to limit the size of DCA's holdings to under 28 % which would be sufficient for a CTS special committee to attempt a sale of the entire company. Id.
Finally, in November, 1986, CTS' directors adopted a third rights plan which was similar
to the plan adopted in April, 1986, except it reduced the minimum price to $35 per share.
1986 CTS ANNUAL REPORT supra note 141, at 12.
306. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
307. CTS, 481 U.S. at 85.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol18/iss1/5

42

Campisi: Edgar v. MITE Corp. and CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America: A

1989]

STATE TAKEOVER LEGISLATION

established by Congress with regard to tender offers.3"'
The MITE Court was concerned with the possible effect delay
might have on the tender offer process. The delay provided by the
Indiana statute and its potential effects are, therefore, the same as
that which was thought to be offensive in MITE. However, if the
Court chooses to follow the analysis in MITE by confusing the purpose of the Williams Act with the means by which Congress sought
to accomplish that objective, it seems to have entirely misinterpreted
the purpose of the sixty day provision-its express purpose being to
prevent offerors from tying up the stock of investors for an indefinite
period of time.309 It has nothing to do with when the offeror should
be permitted to begin purchasing stock. For this, Congress established the twenty day provision, a standard which acts to "strike the
balance between the offeror and the target."3 0 It is difficult to see
how a delay which is nearly twice as long as that established by
Congress can be considered reasonable and not in conflict with the
MITE interpretation of the Williams Act.31 '
2. A Proposed Solution.- Whether the MITE and CTS decisions are correct with regard to the preemption challenge is not the
issue which this Note seeks to address. Instead, the issue is the standard by which the Court has evaluated those statutes.
The Court has chosen to evaluate state takeover legislation using the "purpose analysis" standard enunciated in Hines v. Davidowitz. 312 In applying this purpose analysis, however, the Court has
strayed from the actual purpose of the Williams Act.3 " Each particular provision of a statute has a "purpose" behind its enactment in
that it was designed to accomplish a particular result.3"4 These
should not, however, be confused with the actual purpose of the legislation. Moreover, these "purposes" should not provide the basis by
308. Id.
309. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982); see supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
310. See SEC Release No. 33-6022, [1979-80 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 82,373, 82.595. This release arguably provides evidence that indicates that Congress
believed the 20 day period strikes the balance it sought to create between the target and the
offeror. In 1979 the SEC considered a 30 day period but later abandoned the idea because it
concluded "a minimum period of thirty business days is unnecessarily long." Id.
311. The 50 day period provided by the Indiana Act, IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-7(b)
(West 1989), is substantially longer than the Williams Act's 20 business day requirement. 17
C.F.R. § 24.14e-l(a) (1987).
312. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
313. See supra notes 231-80 and accompanying text.
314. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
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which state legislation will be preempted.3 1 5 By allowing this expansive view of the purpose of the Williams Act to continue as the applicable standard, the Court may preclude states from developing other
provisions which may further the concept of investor protection but
which do not strictly comply with the provisions of the Williams
Act."1 6 It is for this reason that this Note concludes that the current
purpose analysis employed by the Court is not the correct standard
by which state takeover legislation should be judged.
When applying any purpose analysis the Court must, due to the
nature of such an analysis, subjectively characterize the provisions of
the statute being challenged."' 7 The problem, however, is that subjective characterizations are inherently suspect.31" In the context of
state takeover legislation, the Court must subjectively characterize
the provisions of those statutes as either furthering or frustrating the
Williams Act's objective of investor protection. 31 9 This type of characterization of state statues may be more suspect if the provisions of
the federal statute are additionally interpreted to indicate an expanded legislative purpose. 320 The Court, therefore, can and should
limit the amount of subjective analysis necessary to decide any par321
ticular case.
The Court can accomplish this objective by either of two alternatives. First, the Court can continue to employ the purpose analysis
but abandon the expansive view of the Williams Act developed in
315. See generally Comment, supra note 147.
316. See, e.g., Hyde Park Partners v. Connolly, 839 F.2d 837 (1st Cir. 1988) (invalidating the Massachusetts Take-Over Bid Regulation Act); L.P. Acquisition Co. v. Tyson, 772
F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that the Michigan takeover act was preempted by the Wil-

liams Act); Batus, Inc. v. McKay, 684 F. Supp. 637 (D. Nev. 1988) (finding the Nevada
Takeover Act was preempted by the Williams Act); Terry v. Yamashita, 643 F. Supp. 161 (D.
Haw. 1986) (invalidating Hawaii's Control Share Acquisition Act).
317. See Hyde Park Partners,839 F.2d at 850 (stating that "[o]ur task is to indentify
the principal result of [the state law]" and to determine "whether the . . .provisions are
beneficial to investors caught between management and offerors." (emphasis added)); see also
BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 467 (D. Del. 1988) (citing Hyde Park).
318. See generally A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 209-10 (1977); Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of ConstitutionalAdjudication, 52

N.Y.U. L. REv. 36 (1977); Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional
Law, 79 YALE L. J. 1205 (1970).

319. See supra notes 190-248 and accompanying text (discussing the investor protection
purpose of the Act).
320. See supra notes 252-78 and accompanying text (discussing the neutrality interpretation of the Act's purpose).
321. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968) (stating that
"[i]nquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter" and "the stakes
are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork.
...
).
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MITE. The Court would simply focus on the overall objective of the
Act-namely investor protection. The second, and arguably better
alternative, would be for the Court to discard the use of the purpose
analysis completely. A state statute would then be preempted only
where the provisions of that statute directly conflict with the provisions of the Williams Act.322
With regard to the first alternative, if the Court still chooses to
adhere to the standard that a state takeover statute will be preempted if it "stands as an obstacle to the full accomplishment of the
purpose and objective" of the Williams Act,323 the Court need only
determine whether the statute either furthers or frustrates the goal
of investor protection.32 4 The means by which the state seeks to accomplish that goal becomes irrelevant and quite simply should no
longer serve as a basis for preemption in this analysis.
This alternative, however, still leaves the preemption issue subject to a court's interpretation as to whether or not the state statute
furthers the congressional objective of investor protection. 25 This
Note, therefore, proposes that courts eliminate the use of the purpose
analysis altogether and only preempt state legislation which directly
conflicts with the substantive provisions of the Williams Act.3 6
The Williams Act, as it amended the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934,327 is subject to the savings clause of section 28(a) of the
Exchange Act.32 8 This section provides that "[n]othing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission (or any
agency or officer performing like functions) of any State over any
security or person insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of
322.

See supra note 227 and accompanying text (discussing direct conflict as a ground

for preemption).
323.
324.

15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), (e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
See supra note 317-19 and accompanying text.

325. A number of cases have confronted this issue. See, e.g., Hyde Park Partners v.
Connolly, 839 F.2d 837, 849 (1st Cir. 1988); Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 846 F.2d

720, 724 (6th Cir. 1988); L.P. Acquisition Co. v. Tyson, 772 F.2d 201, 207 (6th Cir. 1985);
Cardiff Acquisition, Inc. v. Match, 751 F.2d 906, 913 (8th Cir. 1984); Agency Rent-a-Car,

Inc. v. Connolly, 686 F.2d 1029, 1038-39 (1st Cir. 1982); RP Acquisition Corp. v. Staley
Continental, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 476, 480 (D. Del. 1988); Veere Inc. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 685 F. Supp. 1027, 1029-30 (N.D. Ohio 1988); Batus, Inc. v. McKay, 684 F. Supp.
637, 639 (D. Nev. 1988); BNS Inc. v. Koppers Company, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 458, 467 (D. Del.
1988); Terry v. Yamashita, 643 F. Supp. 161, 166 (D. Haw. 1986).

326. Cf. CTS, 481 U.S. at 96 (Scalia, J., concurring) (finding preemption without a
purpose analysis).

327.

15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d),(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982 & Supp. V. 1987).

328.

Id. § 78bb(a) (1976).
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this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder."3 29 As Justice
Scalia noted "[u]nless it serves no function, that language forecloses
pre-emption on the basis of conflicting 'purpose' as opposed to conflicting 'provision' ... [or at least] refutes the proposition that Congress meant the Williams Act to displace all state laws with conflict3 30
ing purpose.
B.

The Commerce Clause

1. Identifying the Problem.- The tender offer process normally
implies the use of the mails or some other means of interstate commerce. 331 If the offer is accepted, the process also results in transactions that take place across state lines.33 2 For these reasons, state
laws regulating tender offers are subjected to Commerce Clause
scrutiny.
When analyzing state legislation, the Court has developed a
number of tests which can be used to determine whether a state regulation which affects interstate commerce is unconstitutional. 3 3
First, the Commerce Clause will be found to be violated by a state
statute which directly regulates interstate commerce.3 The MITE
Court, when performing its "direct regulation" analysis, included the
issue of extraterritoriality.33 5 This test invalidates a state law which
applies to commerce that takes place wholly outside that state's borders. 3 6 Applying this test, the MITE Court concluded that the Illi329. Id.
330. CTS, 481
331.

U.S. at 96 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).

Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1982).

332. Id.
333. See Raymond Motor Transp. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440-41 (1977) (finding that no
single approach encompasses all cases involving a state statute's effect on interstate
commerce).
334. See Schafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189, 199 (1925) (holding that "a state
statute which by its necessary operation directly interferes with ... [interstate] commerce is a
prohibited regulation .

. . .").

Courts and commentators have, however, found the direct-indi-

rect standard to be misleading and confusing. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw 408 (2d ed. 1988); Maltz, How Much Regulation Is Too Much-An Examination of

Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 47, 48 (1978) (finding that courts
have mistakenly taken an ad hoc approach to the distinction between direct and indirect
regulations).
335. See MITE, 457 U.S. at 641-43.
336.

Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 806 (1976); see also Shaffer v.

Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197 (1977) (stating that "any attempt 'directly' to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over persons or property would offend sister States and exceed the inherent

limits of the States power."); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 775 (1945) (holding
that a state law violated the Commerce Clause where the "practical effect of such regulation
[was] to control [conduct] beyond the boundaries of the state .... ).
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nois Act violated the Commerce Clause since it acted as "a direct
restraint on interstate commerce and [had] a sweeping extraterritorial effect. 337 By contrast, the CTS Court was not concerned with
the extraterritoriality issue.
The Indiana Act in CTS can be characterized as a statute that
regulates tender offers.338 The statute operates to directly interfere
with interstate transactions between non-resident shareholders and a
non-resident offeror similar to the way that the Illinois statute did in
MITE."3 9 However, a distinction was drawn because the Court
found that the Indiana Act applied only to Indiana Corporations
whereas the Illinois statute extends to corporations outside the
state.34 ° The MITE Court was concerned with the possibility that
the Illinois Act would apply even if not a single shareholder was an1
Illinois resident, i.e. to commerce wholly outside of its borders.3
The Indiana Act only applies to corporations having substantial
shareholders in Indiana. 42 Therefore, that statute does not raise the
extraterritoriality issue. 3
A second test developed by the Court will invalidate a state law
that discriminates between in-state and out-of-state participants.
Under this approach, the Illinois and Indiana statutes are the same
in that neither law imposes a greater burden on out-of-state offerors
than it does on similarly situated in-state offerors.3 45 This discrimination test is a valid standard by which all state takeover legislation
can be judged. There is, however, one other point worthy of
comment.
337. MITE, 457 U.S. at 642.
338. See supra notes 293-94 and accompanying text (discussing the limits placed on a
tender offeror by the Indiana Act).
339. See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
340. See CTS, 481 U.S. at 93.
341. MITE, 457 U.S. at 642-43.
342. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-4 (West 1989).
343. CTS, 481 U.S. at 93-94. But see TLX Acquisition Corp. v. Telex Corp., 679 F.
Supp. 1022 (W.D. Okla. 1987) (striking down the Oklahoma Control Share Act since it ap-

plied to out-of-state corporations).
344.

See, e.g., Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 36-37 (1980) (holding a

Florida statute unconstitutional because it only "affected banks, bank holding companies and
trust companies with principal operations outside Florida."); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437
U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (holding that the New Jersey statute violated the principle of non-discrimination). See generally Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making
Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1092 (1986) (noting that

even where the Court says it is "balancing" it is really concerned exclusively with preventing
states from engaging in economic protectionism).
345. CTS, 481 U.S. at 87-88; MITE, 457 U.S. at 642.
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The CTS decision limits its discrimination analysis to the issue
of disparate treatment of in-state and out-of-state offerors. Justice
White's dissent, however, appears to be concerned with the possibility that the Indiana statute has a protectionist purpose and therefore
"discriminates" against out-of-state interests. 46 While this belief is
not untenable,3 47 it demonstrates the subjectivity of the discrimination test.
The issue in a "protectionist" analysis is whether the statute
protects local industry and promotes in-state employment and supply
opportunities at the expense of out-of-state parties.34 8 The concern,
therefore, is the purpose and/or effect of the statute.3 49 By contrast,
the discrimination test, as currently employed, is and should only be
concerned with the equality of the statute's application. 350 This test,
therefore, requires only an analysis of the statute on its face rather
than a study of the statute's purpose and effect.
The third test applied by the Court will invalidate a state statute that may adversely affect interstate commerce by subjecting activities to inconsistent regulations. 5 ' Under this test, the CTS Court
concluded that so long as each state regulates the corporations it
created, each corporation will be subject to the law of only one
state.3 52 Therefore, the Indiana Act did not impose an "impermissi346. CTS, 481 U.S. at 100-01 (White, J., dissenting) (stating that the "Commerce
Clause was included in our Constitution ...to prevent the very type of economic protectionism Indiana's Control Share Chapter represents . . . ."); see also Regan, Siamese Essays: (I)
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine;(II)
ExtraterritorialState Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1865, 1868-73 (1987). See generally
Regan, supra note 344, at 1092 (noting that even where courts articulate a different analysis,
they are really concerned with economic protectionism).
347. See generally Langevoort, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Corporate
Takeovers: A Comment on CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 101 HARV. L. REV.96,
106-08 (1987).
348. See Regan, supra note 344, at 1094-98 (noting that the Commerce Clause was
intended to strike down laws that protect local interests by discriminating against foreigners);
see also B.T. Inv. Managers,Inc., 447 U.S. at 27; Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617
(1978); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 144-45 (1970).
349. See Regan, supra note 344, at 1110-43.
350. CTS, 481 U.S. at 87-88; see also id. at 95 (Scalia, J., concurring).
351. See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642 (1982) (noting that "if Illinois
may impose such regulations, so may other States; and interstate commerce in securities transactions generated by tender offers would be thoroughly stifled."); Kassel v. Consolidated
Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 671 (1981) (objecting to Iowa truck-length regulations
which were "out of step with the laws of all other Midwestern and Western States."); see also
Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 774 (1945) (noting the confusion and difficulty
that would result from the unsatisfied need for uniformity).
352. CTS, 481 U.S. at 88-89.
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ble risk of inconsistent regulation." 353 The MITE Court, on the
other hand, did not explicitly address the problem of inconsistent
regulation. It is obvious, however, that the Court was concerned with
this possibility. 54 Again, the distinction between the two statutes
giving rise to the differing results is the jurisdictional reach of the
statute.3 55 If a state confines the reach of its law to its own corporations as the Court held the statute in CTS did, the threat of invalidation on the basis of inconsistent regulation is essentially
eliminated.
The final test applied by the Court in the context of state takeover statutes is the balancing test announced in Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc.356 This test provides: "Where a statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits. 357
This test is arguably the common ground of the MITE and
CTS decisions. There is no doubt that the MITE decision employs
the Pike balancing test.3 58 Although there are those who believe that
CTS does not employ the Pike test,35 9 the conclusion that a balancing approach was used seems to be well supported.3 60 The use of the
353. Id.
354. See MITE, 457 U.S. at 645 (noting that "only one state should have the authority
to regulate a corporation's internal affairs ... because otherwise a corporation would be faced
with conflicting demands .. ").
355. See supra notes 22-26, 341-344 and accompanying text.
356. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
357. Id. at 142 (citing Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960)).
358. See MITE, 457 U.S. at 643.
359. See, e.g., Regan, supra note 346, at 1866-68 (beginning the discussion by stating:
"The first thing I want to point out about CTS is the absence of any reference to balancing
....
); Langevoort, supra note 347, at 103 n.45 (concluding that the CTS Court refused to
balance); Note, The Delaware Takeover Statute: Constitutionally Infirm Even Under the
Market ParticipantException, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 203, 213 (1988) (authored by Ivy B.
Dodes) (noting that "the CTS Court implicitly dismissed the [Pike] test when analyzing state
statutes which merely regulate 'corporate governance.' "). But see Brown-Forman Distillers
Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 578-79 (1986) (stating that "when a
state statute directly regulates or discriminates against interstate commerce, or ...favor[s] instate interests over out-of-state interests, we have generally struck down the statute without
further inquiry.").
360. Although the Court does not explicitly state that it is balancing, as suggested in
Pike, it does begin the major portion of its Commerce Clause analysis (Part C, CTS, 481 U.S.
at 89-93) by referring to the Seventh Circuit's decision which admittedly used a balancing
analysis. See Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 263 (7th Cir. 1986),
rev'd, 481 U.S. 69 (1987). The key comment by the Court was that "the Court of Appeals
failed to appreciate the significance for Commerce Clause analysis .... CTS, 481 U.S. at 89
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balancing approach in MITE and CTS, and its continued use by the
lower federal courts, 8 1 presents the problem in the area of state
takeover legislation under the Commerce Clause.
The Pike balancing test requires a court to consider whether the
burden on interstate commerce imposed by a state law "is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. 3 6 . As Justice
Scalia noted in his concurring opinion, "such an inquiry is ill suited
to the judicial function and should be undertaken rarely if at all."$63
The concern here, as it was in the area of preemption, is that the
Court must undertake a subjective analysis to determine the primary
purpose of the legislation.364 That determination would entail choosing between the two purposes that are possible in the context of state
takeover legislation-namely, investor protection and management
entrenchment.38 5 Furthermore, even if the Court could accurately
make that determination, it should not be the Court's function to say
(emphasis added). The Court then performed a Commerce Clause analysis which addressed
the significance of state regulation of corporate governance which it claims the Circuit Court
left out. Id. at 91. It would appear from these prefatory remarks that the Court was performing a balancing test, similar to that performed by the Seventh Circuit. Id. at 89-93. In addition, the Court concluded its Commerce Clause analysis by noting that the Indiana Act's effects on interstate commerce are justified by the State's interests in protecting its corporations
and their shareholders, further evincing a balancing, or weighing of interests, approach. See id.
at 93.
Furthermore, Justice Scalia's concurring opinion responding to the majority opinion, argues that:
[w]hile it has become standard practice at least since Pike,... to consider....
whether the burden imposed on commerce by a state statute 'is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits,' . . . such an inquiry is ill suited to the judicial
function and should be undertaken rarely if at all. This case is a good illustration of
the point.
Id. at 95 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
Thus, it can be inferred, based on the text of the majority opinion and the views of Justice
Scalia, that the Court was in fact balancing when it performed its Commerce Clause analysis
in Part III-C of its opinion. Id. at 89-93; see also R.P. Acquisition Corp. v. Staley Continental,
Inc., 686 F. Supp. 476, 487 (D. Del. 1988) (stating "[w]e then apply the same balancing test
the Supreme Court employed in CTS .... ).
361. See, e.g., Hyde Park Partners, L.P. v. Connolly, 839 F.2d 837, 844 (1st Cir. 1988)
(noting "the CTS Court did not indicate that the Pike balancing test was to be abandoned
.... "); R.P. Acquisition Corp., 686 F. Supp. at 487 (stating "[w]e then apply the same
balancing test the Supreme Court employed in CTS .... "); Batus, Inc. v. McKay, 684 F.
Supp. 637, 640 (D. Nev. 1988) (implying a balancing approach by noting that "while the
effect on interstate commerce is great the court perceives no substantial state interest to be
protected . . ").
362. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
363. CTS, 481 U.S. at 95 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also supra note 360.
364. See supra notes 312-19 and accompanying text.
365. See supra notes 89-92, 175-84 and accompanying text.
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that "the protection of entrenched management," if non-discriminatory, "is any less important a 'putative local benefit' than the protection of entrenched shareholders." ' 66 Justice Scalia, believing that
such an inquiry should not be the function of the Court, stated:
I do not know what qualifies us to make that judgment-or the
related judgment as to how effective the present statute is in
achieving one or the other's objective--or the ultimate (and most
ineffable) judgment as to whether, given the importance-level x,
and effectiveness-level y, the
worth of the statute is "outweighed"
3 17
by impact-on-commerce z.
Thus, the ultimate problem with the balancing approach is that
it allows a court to subjectively characterize the statute being
challenged.
What makes this approach even more questionable is that it allows a court to strike down a state law that satisfies all the objective
criteria of the other Commerce Clause tests. As noted in the preemption argument, it is when a court undertakes this type of subjective analysis that it is most suspect. Courts should, therefore, limit
the amount of subjective analysis necessary to decide the Commerce
Clause issue. The following analysis of the Indiana Act demonstrates
the dangers of the subjective analysis under the balancing test and
the possibility that a statute which furthers the concept of investor
protection could be found unconstitutional.
The Indiana Act's extraterritorial effect burdens interstate commerce by permitting the prevention of transactions between non-resident shareholders and non-resident offerors through a shareholder
vote.368 However, this may be only the beginning of the list of adverse effects the statute has on interstate commerce.
For example, the entire tender offer process may be substantially discouraged by the increased costs coupled with the lessened
certainty of success of a tender offer made for shares of a company
located in a state with this type of anti-takeover legislation.3 19 By
discouraging tender offers or providing sufficient delay for manage366.

CTS, 481 U.S. at 95 (Scalia, J., concurring).

367. Id.
368.

See infra text accompanying note 388.

369. See Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576, 580 (4th Cir. 1983) (discussing negative economic effects of Virginia takeover legislation); see also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S.
624, 637 (1982) (analyzing negative economic effects of the delay provisions of the Illinois

law).
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ment resistance, the shareholder may be injured.3 70 It is widely ac-

cepted that shareholders benefit from tender offers 3 ' 1 and it is difficult to see how a statute that hinders their use can claim investor
protection as one of its primary purposes. The shareholder may lose
the opportunity to sell his shares at a substantial premium. In cases
where opposition to a tender offer leads to a higher price received by
target shareholders, there may be no gain in the realm of interstate
commerce. Instead, there could be an overall loss, because the target
company expends resources to ward off the takeover and the bidder
spends more to achieve success-one group's gain is offset by the
other's loss and society as a whole is hurt as resources are inefficiently allocated. 7 2 In reality, shareholder losses increase by the
amount the bidder spends in attempting to overcome that resistance. 3 The result is that fewer tender offers will be made, thereby
harming all shareholders. 7
The obstruction of tender offers also burdens the interstate market for corporate control3. 7 As the MITE Court noted, tender offers

play an important role in "[t]he reallocation of economic resources
to their highest valued use," and the result of burdening them is that
"a process which can improve efficiency and competition, is hindered. 370 As a corollary, the function that tender offers provide an
377
important check on incumbent management is also diminished.

The Indiana statute, which is not limited in application to
tender offers, 37 8 may also inhibit the buying and selling of large

blocks of shares of corporations governed by the statute, and may
further disrupt trading in, and the regulation of, national securities
markets.379 This may not be a statute that merely has an incidental
370. See, e.g,, MITE, 457 U.S. at 643; Telvest, Inc., 697 F.2d at 580; Dynamics Corp.
of America v. CTS Corp. 637 F. Supp. 389, 403 (N.D. Ill.), aftd, 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir.
1986), rev'd, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).

371. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 89, at 1164; supra note 89 and accompanying text.
372. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 89, at 1175.
373. Id.
374. Id. (arguing that resistance is inefficient and diminishes shareholder value).
375. Id. See generally Jensen & Ruback, The Market for CorporateControl: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. EcON. 5 (1983).
376. MITE, 457 U.S. at 643; see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 187, at 1173-74;
Fischel, supra note 187, at 5, 27-28, 45.
377. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 187 at 1169.
378. See supra notes 100-12 and accompanying text.
379. See CTS, 481 U.S. at 99-101 (White, J., dissenting). In this context, the SEC has
contended that "any state regulatory scheme that impairs transactions in securities would seriously threaten the liquidity of the national securities markets and disrupt the federal 'common
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effect on interstate commerce. Its effects could be direct and sub-

stantial.38 0 Even if the state's interests were legitimate, the Act's adverse effects on interstate commerce would easily outweigh those
interests.
The CTS Court's focus on corporate governance actually serves
two purposes in its balancing analysis. 381 The first, and most significant, is the importance of a state's ability to regulate the internal
affairs of the corporations it creates.382 Secondly, the Court focused
on corporate governance to show that the statute has no substantial
effect on interstate commerce since it does not actually regulate

simply defines the attributes of the corpotender offers, but38instead
3
creates.
it
rations
While it is true that states have an important and legitimate

interest in governing their corporations, the Court's reasoning is misplaced. The area of corporate governance, or the regulation of the

internal affairs of a corporation formed within the state, allows a
state to govern "the relationships inter sese of the corporation" 384 on
matters peculiar to the relationships among or between the corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders.38 5 These
matters include regulation of the areas including mergers, voting
market' in securities, thereby vitiating the vital function served by those markets." Brief of
Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae at 46, RP Acquisition Corp. v. Staley
Continental, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 476 (D. Del. 1988) (No. 88-190). In addition, former SEC
Chairman, David S. Ruder stated:
Limitations on the free transferability of securities of corporations which are owned
by shareholders nationwide diminish the efficiency, depth, and liquidity of the nation's securities markets ....I believe it is imprudent for states to use their authority over matters of internal governance as a means of regulating the interstate market for corporate control.
Address by SEC Chairman David S. Ruder, 26th Annual Corporate Counsel Institute, Chicago, II1. (Oct. 7, 1987), quoted in Letter from SEC Chairman David S. Ruder to E. Norman
Veasey, Esq. (Dec. 8, 1987) (on file at Hofstra Law Review) (discussing proposed § 203 of the
Delaware General Corporation Law).
380. See supra notes 370-78 and accompanying text.
381. See supra notes 169-84 and accompanying text.
382. See supra notes 97, 171-74 and accompanying text.
383. See supra notes 175-84 and accompanying text.
384. Reese & Kaufman, The Law Governing CorporateAffairs: Choice of Law and the
Impact of Full Faith and Credit, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 1118, 1124 (1958).
385. See Buxbaum, The Threatened Constitutionalizationof the Internal Affairs Doctrine in CorporationLaw, 75 CALIF. L. REV.29, 43-47 (1987) (discussing "internal affairs" in
the context of corporation law full faith and credit clauses); Kozyris, Corporate Wars and
Choice of Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1, 15 (stating that "[t]here is little doubt that internal affairs
include the corporate organizational structure and the relationships between shareholders and
managers and among shareholders inter se."); Pinto, Takeover Statutes: The Dormant Commerce Clause and State Corporate Law, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 473, 489-92 (1987).
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agreements, election of directors, relative rights and duties of officers, directors, and shareholders, issuance of dividends, shareholder
liability issues and dissenter's rights.38 6 The state, therefore, has ifiT
ability to govern existing intracorporaterelationships.3 87 If the internal affairs doctrine only applies to existing intracorporate relationships, then its application to tender offers is not logically correct.
The Indiana statute seeks to govern relationships that may only exist
in the future and does not govern a corporate relationship at all.388
The Court, however, seemed to extend the internal affairs doctrine on the pretense that it is warranted by the state's desire to
protect the investors of the corporations it creates. 89 It reasoned that
the state of incorporation must be allowed to do so since no other
state can.390 But the Court may well have found that the investor
protection provided by the Indiana Act was non-existent, and that
the statute may actually have served to harm investors. 39' Therefore,
the Indiana Act, in its practical application, may place excessive
burdens on interstate commerce-burdens that far outweigh any local benefits sufficient to invalidate the Act under the balancing test.
2. A Proposed Solution.- While some courts have noted that
under CTS, the balancing test may not apply to statutes that regulate intrastate corporate governance, 92 others still acknowledge that
there are three tests that state takeover statutes must satisfy. 93
First, the statute must not discriminate between in-state and out-ofstate interests; 394 second, it must not subject corporations to inconsis386. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 302 comments a, e
(defining "internal affairs" matters).
387. See Shipman, Some Thoughts About the Role of State Takeover Legislatiorn The
Ohio Takeover Act, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 722, 742 (1970) (questioning whether a tender
offer falls into the ambit of internal affairs regulation).

388. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982) (noting that "[tender offers
contemplate transfers of stock by stockholders to a third party and do not themselves implicate
the internal affairs of the target company."); Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 637
F. Supp. 389, 404 (N.D. Ill.), affd, 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).

389. CTS, 481 U.S. at 91-93.
390.

Id.

391. See supra notes 371-81 and accompanying text (discussing the potential harm to
stockholders.)
392. See Hyde Park Partners, L.P. v. Connolly, 839 F.2d 837, 844 (1st Cir. 1988) (noting that "the balancing test does seem to have been abandoned by the CTS court in cases
where the state law merely regulates intrastate 'corporate governance.' "); BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 472 (D. Del. 1988) (suggesting that the CTS Commerce Clause

test protects regulations limited to in-state corporations and shareholders).
393. See supra notes 330-69 and accompanying text.
394. See RP Acquisition Corp. v. Staley Continental, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 476, 486 (D.
Del. 1988); Veere, Inc. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 685 F. Supp. 1027, 1032 (N.D. Ohio
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tent regulations; 39 5 and third, it must satisfy the requirements of the
balancing test.3 98 6 This Note concludes, however, that regardless of
the corporate governance distinction, the use of the balancing test
should be eliminated.
First, as noted earlier, the Court should limit the amount of
subjective analysis necessary to decide the Commerce Clause issue.3 97 The judiciary is not sufficiently equipped to perform an adequate examination of the economic data on the effects of a state statute on the enacting state as well as on competing states.39 8
Therefore, deference should be given to state legislatures to protect
what they deem to be a valid state interest. 399
Second, it is arguable that the objective tests remaining under
the Commerce Clause are sufficient to protect the national interest
in the free flow of interstate commerce without having to resort to a
court's determination of the purpose behind the legislation. As Justice Scalia has argued:
As long as a State's corporation law governs only its own corporations and does not discriminate against out-of-state interests, it
should survive [the] Court's scrutiny under the Commerce Clause
whether it promotes shareholder welfare or industrial stagnation.
Beyond that, it is for Congress to prescribe its invalidity.""
VI. CONCLUSION
There is little doubt that tender offers will continue to be used
as a means of acquiring corporate control. It therefore seems almost
inevitable that the vast majority of state takeover statutes will one
day be challenged in the court on constitutional grounds. Thus, the
Supreme Court should once again decide the issue of the constitutionality of state takeover legislation in order to establish clear stan1988); Campeau Corp. v. Federated Dep't. Stores, 679 F. Supp. 735, 738 (S.D. Ohio 1988);
TLX Acquisition Corp. v. Telex Corp., 679 F. Supp. 1022, 1029 (W.D. Okla. 1987).
395. RP Aquisition Corp., 686 F. Supp. at 486; Veere, Inc., 685 F. Supp. at 1032;
Campeau Corp., 679 F. Supp. at 738; TLX Aquisition Corp., 679 F. Supp. at 1029.
396. RP Aquisition Corp., 686 F. Supp. at 486-87; Veere, Inc., 685 F. Supp. at 1033;
TLX Aquisition Corp., 679 F. Supp. at 1029.
397. See supra notes 317-20 and accompanying text.
398. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamic Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 95 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
399. See Langevoort, supra note 347, at 103 n.45 (concluding that the refusal to balance and scrutinize takeover legislation indicates a court's deference to a state attempting to
regulate interests that are local in character).
400. CTS, 481 U.S. at 95 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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dards by which these statutes should be judged.
Justice Scalia's pointed concurrence is the course that the Court
should take in both the areas of preemption and under the dormant
Commerce Clause. What is most important, however, is that the
Court decide these issues by establishing standards that are much
less subjective and less dependent on how a particular court characterizes the substantive provisions of the state takeover statute being
challenged.
P. Joseph Campisi, Jr.
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